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RESCINDING INCLUSION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: 




The rescission of programs, policies, and practices by an incoming 
administration often raises legal questions. However, answers are harder 
to find. That is the case with the whirlwind of rollbacks proposed and 
implemented by the Trump administration in areas from transgender 
persons in the military to asking a citizenship question on the census and 
terminating Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS). This Article provides a lens for 
assessing the legality of these seemingly precipitous moves. Viewing 
these abrupt paradigm shifts as threshold rescissions clarifies the legal 
landscape. Threshold measures govern baseline access to goods and 
institutions, including military service, political representation, and living 
and working legally in the United States. Under current case law, changes 
to many threshold measures would be purely discretionary, subject to 
very relaxed judicial review or no review at all. This Article suggests that 
reliance interests in threshold measures warrant a more robust judicial 
role in assessing the means–ends fit of proposed rescissions, equivalent 
to intermediate scrutiny in equal protection cases. The prior factfinding 
and legislative support invested in reforms slated for rescission further 
justify more probing judicial inquiry. The approach urged here also 
supplies a welcome normative dimension to scholarly discussions of 
administrative constitutionalism. Scholars have highlighted agency 
readings to expand individual rights. President Obama’s administration 
did this in the context of ending the military’s ban on accession and 
retention of transgender service members. The Trump administration 
now wishes to partially roll back that inclusive measure. Current 
officials’ approach to transgender accession and retention reveals that 
administrative constitutionalism is contested terrain: one administration’s 
salutary expansion of individual rights strikes a new administration as 
defaulting on responsibility, overreaching on power, and interfering with 
the rights of other parties. There may be common ground, including 
former Defense Secretary James Mattis’s decision to grandfather in 
transgender service members who acted in reliance on the Obama 
administration’s reform. However, the intermediate scrutiny applied here 
would invalidate most other components of the Defense Department’s 
transgender rollback, and would require further process and explanation 
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before upholding a citizenship question on the census or the termination 
of DACA and TPS. In addition, the approach taken here harmonizes with 
the United States Supreme Court's finding in the census citizenship-
question case that the Commerce Department's reliance on Voting Rights 
Act enforcement was pretextual. Analyzing the means–ends fit of 
threshold rescissions promotes more effective deliberation about abrupt 
changes, while allowing a new administration to refine its rationale. 
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CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1477 
INTRODUCTION 
Rolling back Obama Administration measures has been a signature 
move of the Trump Administration. For example, the Trump 
Administration has sought to rescind grants of Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS),1 
substantially reverse the Obama Administration’s steps toward accession 
into the military of transgender individuals,2 and depart from 
longstanding practice by asking a question on the United States census 
about citizenship status.3 Judicial outcomes have been mixed thus far, 
with the United States Supreme Court upholding an injunction against the 
census citizenship question4 and granting a stay of lower court injunctions 
against the transgender rescission,5 and an appellate court ruling that 
challengers to the DACA rescission had stated an equal protection claim.6 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney Gen., U.S., to Elaine C. Duke, 
Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/publications/17_0904_DOJ_AG-letter-DACA.pdf [https://perma.cc/54MP-VN6V]; 
Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 22, 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0622_S1_Memorandum_DACA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A2WR-WW6J]; see also Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1108–09 
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (enjoining termination of TPS for Sudan, Haiti, El Salvador, and Nicaragua). 
 2. See Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S., to James N. Mattis, 
Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., and Jefferson B. Sessions III, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Mar. 
23, 2018), https://partner-mco-archive.s3.amazonaws.com/client_files/1521897503.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/CCD6-PUGD]. 
 3. See Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, to Karen Dunn 
Kelley, Under Sec’y for Econ. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4426785-commerce2018-03-26-2.html [https:// 
perma.cc/HHH2-A6N3]. See generally New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 
502 (S.D.N.Y.) (setting aside Secretary Ross’s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 
census as arbitrary and capricious), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 953 (2019). 
 4. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019). 
 5. See Orders of the Court – Term Year 2018: Order List of January 22, 2019, SUPREME 
CT. OF THE U.S. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/ 
012219zor_8759.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CAN-QBLN]; see also Sarah Grant, Supreme Court 
Stays Injunctions in Trans Ban Case: What Happens Now?, LAWFARE (Jan. 22, 2019, 11:44 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-stays-injunctions-trans-ban-case-what-happens-
now [https://perma.cc/C3HN-MRWE] (discussing this). In one case, a district court enjoined the 
new transgender restrictions, and the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded that decision. See Doe 
2 v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 474, 498 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d, Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19 
(D.C. Cir. 2019).  
 6. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 520 (9th Cir. 
2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019). The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the DACA 
rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. 
No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)). 
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While the substantive law in each of these cases is different,7 the 
approaches taken by courts reveal a methodological confusion that goes 
beyond substantive distinctions. The confusion arises because 
constitutional law has no uniform approach to rollbacks of inclusive 
policies. Such an approach is urgently needed, particularly in the areas of 
immigration, citizenship, and national security, where the Trump 
Administration has been most active. 
President Trump’s penchant for upending settled understandings in 
law, policy, and rhetoric complicates the courts’ role. It is tempting to 
view President Trump as a rogue president who has compromised his 
own oath of office and thus merits more rigorous judicial review than 
other occupants of the White House.8 However, the Supreme Court has 
already cautioned against this course, noting that courts reviewing actions 
by President Trump are, as with judicial review of decisions by other 
presidents, necessarily reviewing “the Presidency itself.”9 Pivoting too 
hastily from courts’ traditional deferential posture on national security 
and immigration can obscure the “delicate” touch required in assessing 
presidential statements and decisions.10 As the Court suggested in Trump 
v. Hawaii,11 the courts have to fashion rules that apply to all subsequent 
occupants of the White House—not just Donald Trump.12  
Similarly, courts must recognize that in the context of democratic 
governance, administrative rescissions are a feature, not a bug. 
Individuals running for president regularly define their candidacies in 
                                                                                                                 
Id. This Article focuses only on the constitutional issues, although administrative law scholarship 
informs its analysis.  
 7. Transsubstantive legal norms have received increased attention from scholars. See 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 38 (2001) (analyzing implementation 
of constitutional norms); William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1107–12 (2017) (discussing interpretive rules); Mitchell N. Berman, 
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 30–50 (2004) (analyzing prophylactic rules such 
as Miranda that promote compliance with constitutional rights); Robert M. Chesney, National 
Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1362–66 (2009) (discussing national security and 
foreign relations context); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law 
Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650–52 (2005) (discussing links between 
judicial practice and legal norms); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213–37 (1978) (discussing how 
the selection of a legal standard causes under- or over-enforcement of norms). 
 8. See generally Andrew Kent et al., Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (examining the origin of the U.S. Constitution’s “faithful execution” 
requirement upon the President). 
 9. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) (upholding on both constitutional and 
statutory grounds President Trump’s proclamation limiting immigration from certain majority-
Muslim countries, as well as North Korea and Venezuela).  
 10. Id. 
 11. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 12. Id. at 2418. 
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contrast to the policies of the current chief executive.13 In the 
administrative law sphere, “exits” from a previous administration’s 
initiatives are a stock in trade of presidential transitions.14 Moreover, 
these pivots can stem from fundamental disagreements about the contours 
of constitutional law. One administration’s expansion of rights through 
agency action can be a subsequent administration’s bureaucratic 
overreaching.  
Agency expansions of rights can trigger three kinds of conflicts. First, 
and perhaps most obviously, an expansive agency view of rights may 
conflict with a subsequent administration’s view of its constitutional 
responsibility to protect the nation’s safety. For example, former 
Secretary of Defense James Mattis asserted that the need to maintain 
combat readiness and foster the cohesion of military units required a 
partial rollback of the inclusive policy on transgender service members 
announced by the Obama Administration.15 Second, as in the reaction to 
President Obama’s immigration initiatives such as DACA,16 expansions 
of rights or benefits through unilateral agency action may trigger concern 
                                                                                                                 
 13. James Risen, The Executive Power Awaiting the Next President, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/weekinreview/22risen.html [https://perma.cc/ 
E9NN-KRT2] (reporting that then-candidate Barack Obama was “sharply critical” of the 
“expansive” view of presidential power taken by then-president George W. Bush). Candidate 
Donald Trump’s criticism of President Obama was more personal and invidious, in its false 
premise that Obama was not a natural-born citizen of the United States. See Maggie Haberman & 
Alan Rappeport, Trump Drops False ‘Birther’ Theory, but Floats a New One: Clinton Started It, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/politics/donald-trump-
birther-obama.html [https://perma.cc/46RL-4LLM] (reporting that, after five years of steadfastly 
maintaining his “birther” claim, then-candidate Trump backed away from that position in the final 
weeks of the 2016 campaign). 
 14. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Presidential Exit, 67 DUKE L.J. 1729, 1732–34 (2018) 
[hereinafter Rulh & Salzman, Presidential Exit]; J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2015) [hereinafter Ruhl & Salzman, Regulatory Exit]. 
 15. Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 917 F.3d 694, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 16. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 180 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally 
divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).  
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about excessive use of government power.17 Third, rights may conflict, 
spurring efforts to halt or temper reforms.18  
Each of these rationales for rescission also complicates the analysis of 
both the rollback and the previous measure as forms of what scholars 
have recently called administrative constitutionalism. Groundbreaking 
works of administrative constitutionalism have related how 
administrative agencies have expanded the content of constitutional 
rights through rules on conscientious objection from the military draft,19 
welfare programs,20 and employment law.21 The measures that the Trump 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 872–73 (2015) [hereinafter 
Tani, Administrative Equal Protection] (noting that after New Deal federal welfare officials and 
their successors had sought for over twenty years to combat arbitrary and invidious state policies, 
a longtime official wrote an influential memorandum warning against tying federal funding to 
southern states’ integration); cf. KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND 
AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935–1972, at 248 (2016) [hereinafter TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY] 
(describing 1960s federal officials’ politically-based wariness about taking a public stance 
favoring vigorous enforcement of a newly enacted federal civil rights statute barring racial 
discrimination in programs receiving federal funds). Earlier, U.S. military lawyers had argued 
after America’s entrance into World War I that the Wilson Administration’s expansive definition 
of conscientious objector status—crafted by then-War Department lawyer and future Supreme 
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter—exceeded executive power under a statute that had narrowly 
defined conscientious objection to the draft. See Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins 
of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1111–22, 1138–39 (2014) (discussing 
Justice Frankfurter’s memorandum on the subject and military lawyers’ opposing argument that 
Justice Frankfurter’s expansive definition, rooted in civil liberties, conception of the military as 
embodying American freedoms, and presidential discretion contravened clear statutory 
command).  
 18. See generally New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502 (discussing, 
but then rejecting, the position taken by the Justice Department that a citizenship question on the 
census was necessary to implement Voting Rights Act and implement one-person-one-vote 
principle by preventing vote dilution). This abiding concern animated the D.C. Circuit’s 
invalidation of Federal Communications rules requiring broadcasters to adopt certain kinds of 
affirmative action programs. See Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 353–56 
(D.C. Cir. 1998).  
 19. Kessler, supra note 17. 
 20. See TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY, supra note 17; Tani, Administrative Equal 
Protection, supra note 17. 
 21. See, e.g., Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism 
and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 800–01 (2010). Other scholars have 
addressed how agencies can set up internal watchdogs that promote constitutional values and 
moderate agency moves that may overreach, especially in national security. See generally Shirin 
Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 1027 (2013) (discussing safeguards against government overreaching provided by 
inspectors general); Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s 
Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 112, 194 (2015) (arguing that placement of 
privacy officers in compliance units has beneficial effects, but it also frustrates integration of civil 
liberties concerns into initial policy formulation). 
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Administration has sought to rescind fall under administrative 
constitutionalism’s rubric. In each case, prior administrations have 
sought to expand conceptions of rights beyond what prior case law or the 
express language of the Constitution or statutes provided.22  
In seeking to roll back these measures, the Trump Administration has 
invoked its constitutional responsibility, the limits on presidential power, 
and prior measures’ failure to adequately protect other rights. Rescission 
is therefore not merely about a new democratically elected president 
rolling back the product of a predecessor’s constitutional vision; it also 
requires courts to sort out competing visions of administrative 
constitutionalism. Because the work of administrative constitutionalists 
has centered on a rich historical account of executive branch officials’ 
perspectives and decisions, it has tended to focus less on the normative 
analysis of judicial approaches or the normative ordering of competing 
versions of constitutionalism.23 This Article aims to fill that gap.  
This Article’s approach addresses threshold agency measures. In this 
Article, threshold measures concern fundamental access points. To 
qualify as a threshold, access must include an agency or entity’s 
application of criteria that limit participation based on race, gender, or 
sexual orientation, restrict the ability to work legally and remain in the 
United States, or adversely affect participation in the political system. 
Moreover, to qualify as threshold rescissions, agency shifts must 
adversely affect reliance interests.  
This approach covers a narrow subset of agency rescissions. Most 
regulatory changes, including those addressing regulation of industrial, 
commercial, or financial processes, would not qualify. In other words, 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105, 107 (2014) 
(asserting that DACA stemmed from a vision of inclusion and equity in pre-presidential writings 
of then-senator Barack Obama and echoed earlier uses of presidential authority to safeguard 
“intending Americans” from adverse actions by non-federal sovereigns). Scholars have also 
cautioned that expanding certain rights beyond judicial precedent or express statutory parameters 
may impinge on others’ rights or trigger other adverse effects. See David E. Bernstein, 
Antidiscrimination Laws and the Administrative State: A Skeptic’s Look at Administrative 
Constitutionalism, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1387–89 (2019) (criticizing Obama 
Administration officials’ advice to college administrators to strengthen procedures for 
investigating and adjudicating students’ sexual assault claims as impinging on rights of the 
accused and suggesting that perceived excesses of this policy guidance reveal normative gaps in 
administrative constitutionalist literature).  
 23. To be sure, scholars have addressed the interaction of case law and administrative 
constitutional visions. See Tani, Administrative Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 885–99. 
However, for administrative constitutionalists, historical and descriptive questions have been 
more pressing than normative concerns, in part because this emerging strand of scholarship has 
viewed much traditional court-centered legal academic work as neglecting the study of 
administrative officials’ thought. 
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this Article does not aim to constitutionalize vast stretches of 
administrative law. Most proposed changes will continue to be assessed 
largely under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).24 Most 
discretionary agency decisions, including individual decisions on 
whether to prosecute or commence regulatory proceedings, will not be 
covered and indeed may not be reviewable at all.25   
This Article argues that courts should subject threshold rescissions to 
intermediate scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, a party challenging a 
threshold rescission would need to show only that the rescission was not 
tailored to serve a significant government interest.26 Particularly in the 
national security and foreign relations arena, this standard is more robust 
than the deferential review that courts usually conduct.27 Moreover, this 
standard does not require proof of discriminatory intent, which current 
equal protection doctrine would require in most other contexts.28  
Three factors justify this more robust standard. First, threshold 
rescissions impair reliance interests. For example, the transgender service 
members who disclosed their identity after the Obama Administration 
announced its more inclusive policy would be at risk under a total 
rescission.29 Indeed, the 2018 Mattis policy that restores some limits 
recognizes this problem by giving certain transgender service members 
the right to continue in the military.30 Second, courts’ institutional 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 
701–706 (2012)).  
 25. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (holding that most agency 
decisions not to initiate proceedings against specific targets were unreviewable because they 
involved balancing variables including available agency resources regarding which agency had 
superior knowledge, and courts were ill-equipped to intervene). Agency rescissions may trigger 
statutory issues—including those under the APA—but those issues are not this Article’s focus. 
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 530 (2009) (upholding FCC change to 
application of broadcast indecency policies under APA). In Fox, Justice Scalia disparaged the 
notion that a mere regulatory change, even one involving constitutional issues such as free speech, 
should necessarily trigger more exacting scrutiny under the APA. Id. at 515–16. However, Justice 
Scalia did note that in explaining a rescission, an agency should take into account “serious reliance 
interests.” Id. at 515. This Article stems from a comparable intuition, although it defines reliance 
interests in a broader fashion. For analysis of Fox, see William W. Buzbee, The Tethered 
President: Consistency and Contingency in Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1399–
1400 (2018); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 483–86 (2010). 
 26. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017). 
 27. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419–20 (2018). 
 28. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
 29. See German Lopez, Trump’s Ban on Transgender Troops, Explained, VOX (Jan. 22, 
2019, 11:12 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/7/26/16034366/trump-transgender-
military-ban [https://perma.cc/4K9F-A7TB]. 
 30. See Memorandum from James N. Mattis, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Donald 
J. Trump, President of the U.S. (Feb. 22, 2019), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Mar/23/ 
8
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competence favors a more robust standard; courts have the benefit of 
prior administrative fact-finding favoring a more inclusive measure.31 On 
the census, for example, a succession of officials from both parties 
supported the Census Bureau’s expert judgment that a citizenship 
question would deter responses.32 Third, a previously promulgated 
inclusive measure will often have a significant quantum of support in 
Congress. DACA, for example, enjoyed a substantial quantum of 
bipartisan legislative support.33 
Robust means–ends scrutiny would require the government to show 
more in threshold rescissions. On the rescission of the Obama 
Administration’s inclusive transgender military policy, intermediate 
scrutiny would disaggregate the rescission’s components. Courts should 
                                                                                                                 
2001894037/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-SERVICE-BY-TRANSGENDER-INDIVIDUALS.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/5XUQ-Z6S9]. 
 31. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed courts’ relative lack of expertise and access 
to data on difficult national security decisions. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (“[W]hen it comes 
to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences [regarding national security] . . . ‘the lack 
of competence on the part of the courts is marked’” (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010))); cf. Chesney, supra note 7, at 1362–66 (discussing traditional judicial 
deference).  
 32. La Unión del Pueblo Entero v. Ross, 353 F. Supp. 3d 381, 392–95 (D. Md. 2018); New 
York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 315 F. Supp. 3d 766, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).  
 33. See Kevin R. Johnson, Lessons About the Future of Immigration Law from the Rise and 
Fall of DACA, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 368 (2018) (noting support for DACA from Speaker 
Paul Ryan and Senator Orrin Hatch). The congressional support for DACA, coupled with a history 
of presidential actions to protect intending Americans, was arguably sufficient to constitute 
legislative acquiescence. See Margulies, supra note 22, at 107–08. Legislative acquiescence 
would entitle the inclusive measure to a middling level of judicial deference under Justice 
Jackson’s landmark framework parsing executive power. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also id. at 610–11 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing importance of historical “gloss” gleaned from pattern of 
congressional–executive branch interactions over time); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 
2567 (2014) (affirming the importance of historical perspective on active and tacit understandings 
between the political branches); cf. Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in 233, 
273–75 PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) 
(discussing the history of Youngstown litigation). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. 
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012) (tracing 
the development of the view that a pattern of legislative acquiescence broadens judicial deference 
to executive power); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Congress and the President in Wartime, LAWFARE 
(2017) (reviewing David Barron’s book, Waging War: The Clash Between Presidents and 
Congress, 1776 to ISIS) (discussing challenges in determining where among Justice Jackson’s 
categories the particular exercise of wartime executive power fits), 
www.lawfareblog.com/congress-and-president-wartime [https://perma.cc/29ML-LQAN]. A 
measure like DACA may be too recent to claim the mantle of historical “gloss.” Moreover, 
approval of DACA was certainly not unanimous among legislators. However, demonstrations of 
bipartisan support, such as Speaker Ryan and Senator Hatch’s support for DACA, go some way 
toward showing the rescinded measure’s democratic pedigree.   
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acknowledge the 2018 Mattis policy’s grandfathering in of certain 
transgender service members and its inclusion of some individuals who 
identify with a gender other than their assigned one. Moreover, a 
significant component of the 2018 policy—its requirement of thirty-six 
months of stability for new recruits—would pass muster. However, the 
2018 policy’s bar on accession of transitioned individuals would fall, as 
would its bar on retention of persons outside of the grandfathered group 
who in the future require accommodations or medical treatment. The 
census citizenship question would require more testing, while the 
rescissions of DACA and TPS respectively would require more 
comprehensive explanation than the Trump Administration has 
provided.34 
A more deliberative democracy would emerge from disaggregating 
the parts of the 2018 transgender policy and requiring more elaboration 
about the census, DACA, and TPS. Courts do a disservice to both 
democracy and deliberation by failing to separately parse the transgender 
policy’s principal features and analyzing each on its own merits.35 That 
more nuanced analysis also highlights the 2018 policy’s stilted and static 
account of unquestioned virtues such as unit cohesion. With respect to 
the census, DACA, and TPS, the additional elaboration required by the 
approach taken here would realign incentives, encouraging an 
administration to develop sound justifications before it issued a rescission 
in the first place. That prophylactic ex ante effect will surely aid the cause 
of deliberation that the Framers embraced.  
By allowing both continuity and flexibility in addressing a 
predecessor’s inclusive initiatives, the approach taken here also seeks to 
provide a normative dimension to the administrative constitutionalist 
literature, which has often stressed descriptive and historical 
perspectives. Highlighting the judicial role could be viewed as a 
distraction from administrative constitutionalists’ focus on agencies as an 
antidote to preoccupation with the courts, Congress, or the President. 
However, perhaps this piece can instead facilitate further engagement 
between normative analysis and administrative constitutionalism’s 
salutary historical work. 
This Article unfolds in four parts. Part I discusses the approach taken 
here, introducing administrative constitutionalism as a framework, 
discussing its normative tensions, and addressing the need for more 
robust means–ends scrutiny of threshold rescissions. Part II analyzes the 
                                                                                                                 
 34. In the census, DACA, and TPS rescissions, challengers would also be able to show 
discriminatory intent, which the traditional test requires, although the approach outlined in this 
Article does not. 
 35. See Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (contrasting Secretary 
of Defense Mattis’s policy and President Trump’s tweets in the course of vacating a district court 
injunction against the new transgender restrictions). 
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2018 transgender policy in light of this approach. Part III discusses the 
census. Part IV addresses both DACA and TPS. Each situation entails 
competing versions of administrative constitutionalism. Ranking those 
iterations through means–ends scrutiny will help safeguard deliberative 
democracy. 
I.  ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
THRESHOLD RESCISSIONS 
Scholars of administrative constitutionalism have argued that 
agencies regularly make decisions that revise or expand constitutional 
interpretation.36 Yet, as these scholars have recognized, since agencies 
are a “they,” not an “it,”37 decisions that expand certain aspects of 
constitutionalism can also trigger pushback from regulatory colleagues.38 
Indeed, that pushback often entails competing visions of 
constitutionalism, stemming from disagreements regarding agency 
responsibility, authority, and concern for conflicting rights.39  
                                                                                                                 
 36. See Lee, supra note 21, at 800–01; TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY, supra note 17, at 
246; Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1901–02 (2013) 
(discussing issues of legitimacy in agency actions that rely on constitutional interpretation, 
particularly when that interpretation is only thinly acknowledged in agency rationale). 
Administrative constitutionalist scholars have noted parallels between this school of thought and 
other recent work on how non-judicial actors construct constitutional meaning. See Keith E. 
Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 120, 128 
(2010); see also Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 
519, 553–61 (2015) (analyzing how administrative interpretations aid in the process of 
“experimentalism” and thus further the adaptation of constitutional principles to contemporary 
needs).  
 37. In other words, agencies are not unitary; they often feature tensions between different 
officials and units within the agency that interact with different stakeholders and have competing 
agendas. Scholars from a range of points on the ideological spectrum recognize this reality. See 
Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139, 
164–65 (2018); Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive 
Branch is a “They,” Not an “It,” 96 MINN. L. REV. 194, 197 (2011); Tani, Administrative Equal 
Protection, supra note 17, at 864–67 (discussing tensions within federal agencies regulating state 
provision of welfare benefits regarding scope of federal authority to require that states allocate 
benefits fairly and equally). 
 38. See Memorandum from Rufus Miles, Admin. Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ. 
and Welfare, to the Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ. and Welfare (Jan. 9, 1960) (on file with the 
author) (cautioning administrators against using broad constitutional reading to support what 
Miles viewed as an unduly aggressive use of threat of federal funding termination to shape state 
welfare criteria); cf. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 872–73 (discussing 
Miles’s view). I am indebted to Professor Tani for making a copy of this memorandum available.  
 39. See Miles, supra note 38, at 3 (urging administrators to stay within agency’s 
“responsible exercise of its proper role without over-reaching”).  
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A.  Administrative Constitutionalism and Individual Rights 
Administrative constitutionalists have focused most closely on agency 
expansions of rights. They have argued, based on careful and compelling 
review of agency records and correspondence, that agencies have 
promoted rights beyond what courts at a particular time required in a 
range of areas, including conscientious objection to the military draft, 
welfare benefits, and fair employment.40 For example, Karen Tani writes, 
officials at agency precursors of today’s Department of Health and 
Human Services invoked constitutional values of due process and equal 
protection to curb states that sought to restrict on moralistic or other 
grounds indigent families’ access to government benefits.41 Sophia Lee 
has studied efforts by the Federal Communications Commission to 
promote fair employment and diverse workplaces for broadcast 
licensees.42 Jeremy Kessler has written about the efforts of War 
Department lawyers like future Supreme Court Justices Felix Frankfurter 
and Harlan Stone.43 During World War I, Frankfurter and Stone expanded 
the definition of conscientious objector status beyond Congress’s 
definition to include “unorganized” objectors who did not belong to any 
distinct religious group but nonetheless expressed sincere and profound 
opposition to participation in armed conflict.44 In a number of the cases 
studied by administrative constitutionalist scholars, the courts or 
Congress eventually expanded rights that the agencies had previously 
recognized, although in most cases neither branch went as far in 
expanding rights as the high-water mark in agency officials’ own 
aspirations.45  
                                                                                                                 
 40. See TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY, supra note 17, at 71 (welfare benefits); Kessler, 
supra note 17, at 1133–36 (conscientious objection); Lee, supra note 21, at 801 (employment); 
Reuel E. Schiller, Comment, The Administrative State, Front and Center: Studying Law and 
Administration in Postwar America, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 415, 422 (2008) (free speech and 
censorship).  
 41. See generally Tani, Administrative Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 867–73 
(discussing agency’s interactions with Louisiana over state rules that limited the benefits available 
to mothers with children born out of wedlock).  
 42. See Lee, supra note 21, at 811–18 (discussing FCC officials’ emerging interest in 
Kennedy administration in requiring licensees to practice fair employment). 
 43. Kessler, supra note 17. 
 44. Kessler, supra note 17, at 1111–23. 
 45. See Tani, Administrative Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 884–90 (discussing the 
Warren Court’s case law and other pro-recipient decisions, although as part of the ebb and flow 
of constitutional law noting later more pro-state precedents of the Burger Court, such as 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), which limited constitutional claims by upholding 
state discretion to cap total welfare benefits available to any family per month so that parents with 
more dependent children received proportionately reduced amounts for each child). During the 
New Deal and World War II, federal agency lawyers had an extraordinary influence on the 
legislative process, including close contact with members of Congress drafting statutes and 
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Yet the administrative constitutionalism revealed in such innovations 
was arguably just one of several competing forms of administrative 
constitutionalism within the agency and among its many stakeholders. To 
temper the vision of expanded rights that administrative constitutionalism 
furthered, another competing vision stressed the limited powers of the 
federal government. For example, when federal welfare officials sought 
to invoke the Constitution to prevent Louisiana from conditioning receipt 
of welfare benefits on a parent’s provision of a “suitable home” for 
children, a longtime federal welfare administrator warned that neither the 
Constitution nor any federal statute allowed officials to use federal funds 
as leverage to prod the state into compliance with officials’ views.46 As 
the senior official cautioned, an expansive administrative constitutional 
interpretation would constitute the exercise of “unrestrained power,” 
“usurp the proper role of the courts,” and “over-reach the role of the 
Executive Branch.”47  
Similarly, government lawyers opposed to the expansive vision of 
conscientious objector status articulated by Justices Frankfurter and 
Stone argued that Congress, in exercising its constitutional power to set 
rules for the armed forces, had expressly demarcated the bounds of that 
status.48 For these internal critics, expanding the definition beyond 
Congress’s express limits would contravene Congress’s authority.49 
While the courts ultimately held that the First Amendment required a 
broader definition, that development occurred much later—well after the 
conclusion of World War I.50 But Justices Frankfurter and Stone’s push 
past Congress’s limits occurred immediately. And Justice Frankfurter’s 
memorandum on the subject devoted no space whatsoever to the 
separation of powers concerns raised by his proposed policy or even to 
                                                                                                                 
legislative history, as well as including legislative history in briefs in those pre-Internet days when 
such materials were often difficult for other litigants to find. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan 
and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative 
History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 338–42 (2013). Agency influence during this formative 
period surely contributed to administrators’ sense of the leverage they could wield in both 
interpretation and implementation.  
 46. See Miles, supra note 38. 
 47. Id. at 2–3. Courts eventually found that some of these state practices violated federal 
law. See Tani, Administrative Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 867–73 (discussing the 
Louisiana “suitable home[s]” controversy). 
 48. See Kessler, supra note 17, at 1126–27. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Cf. id. at 1161–63 (discussing the evolution of Justices Frankfurter and Stone’s thinking 
after their appointments to the Supreme Court and the latter’s increased focus on judicial 
protections for civil liberties). 
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specific discussion of the First Amendment, preferring to center on 
executive discretion.51 
In other cases, competing visions of administrative constitutionalism 
stressed the rights or interests of other individuals. For example, the 
senior federal official’s warning about overreaching in policing 
restrictive state welfare rules also cautioned about the negative impact of 
terminating federal funds to the state on other indigent individuals or 
institutions that received benefits.52 A few years after the senior official’s 
warning, Congress enacted legislation that conditioned receipt of federal 
funding on compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws.53 Courts 
have upheld such legislation as an appropriate exercise of legislative 
power under the Spending Clause.54 However, in the absence of such 
clear legislative authority, the senior official’s concern was legitimate.55 
One can argue that swift and decisive action was necessary to deter 
punitive and moralistic state policies, especially when those policies also 
contained a racial dimension. But counterarguments should not obscure 
the importance of a full internal policy debate as well as legislative input. 
Some officials’ push to scuttle state restrictions may have submerged 
these other considerations.  
In addition, critics of certain iterations of administrative 
constitutionalism contended that the expansive readings of rights 
undermined federal responsibility for national security grounded in the 
Constitution itself. Government lawyers opposing Justices Frankfurter 
and Stone’s expansive reading of conscientious objector status argued 
strenuously that the military needed all potential personnel for the war 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. at 1111–23; Justice Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum for the Secretary of War: 
Treatment of Conscientious Objectors 2 (Sept. 18, 1917) (discussing conscientious objector status 
as an “administrative or military problem concerning the use to which certain men called to the 
colors are to be put in view of their peculiar fitness or unfitness”) (manuscript on file with the 
author). I am indebted to Jeremy Kessler for access to a copy of this memo.  
 52. See Miles, supra note 38, at 2 (warning of consequences of hypothetical federal funding 
cut-off to state “land-grant colleges” or “church-supported schools”). Federal funding 
terminations continue to be a fraught endeavor. See Eloise Pasachoff, Agency Enforcement of 
Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense of the Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE L.J. 248, 334 (2014) 
(urging more tenacious federal enforcement of grant conditions).  
 53. See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601–605, 78 Stat. 
241, 252–53 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7 (2012)). 
 54. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 576–78 (2012) (analyzing 
parameters of Congress’s spending power). 
 55. Current concerns expressed by some Justices of the Supreme Court take this argument 
a step further, asserting that the Constitution forbids excessive delegations from Congress to 
agencies. See Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 24–28 (2017). But questions about whether agency action in a particular case fits within 
Congress’s delegation do not rely on this more radical position.  
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effort, which would be hobbled by less than full participation.56 The 
relatively modest number of conscientious objectors, even under Justices 
Frankfurter and Stone’s more expansive paradigm, suggests that this fear 
was overblown. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge this strand 
of opposition, which stems from the legitimate government interest in 
successful prosecution of the war effort.57  
In sum, celebrating administrative constitutionalism is both salutary 
and perilous. Acknowledging the resourceful responses of sometimes 
beleaguered administrators to unfairness and inequality is important and 
overdue. A deep descriptive dive into those courageous administrators’ 
actions reveals much about the origins of constitutional rights. It also 
offers, as in the welfare officials’ vision, tantalizing hints of a more 
positive government duty to assist people living in poverty. Yet, these 
salutary effects could also benefit from a normative frame that considers 
transitions to and from such expansive readings in light of competing 
concerns, which often themselves have constitutional ramifications.  
B.  The Role of the Courts in Assessing Threshold Rescissions 
Many rescissions of administrative constitutionalist measures should 
not trigger constitutional concerns. In some cases, resulting friction plays 
out in both the political realm and the court of public opinion. In other 
cases, the APA alone is sufficient to address the issue.58 Under this 
Article’s approach, the Constitution is relevant to what this Article calls 
“threshold” rescissions. 
An agency’s threshold rules can be internal or external. Either way, 
they govern access to basic goods and attributes, such as baseline criteria 
for participation in the entity, or core interests with a constitutional 
dimension, such as the ability to remain in the United States or the 
apportionment of political representatives.59 Rescissions of such 
threshold rules trigger substantial collateral impacts, through either 
creation of orphan groups protected by earlier rules but subject to post-
                                                                                                                 
 56. Kessler, supra note 17, at 1090.  
 57. See generally Matthew C. Waxman, The Power to Wage War Successfully, 117 COLUM. 
L. REV. 613 (2017) (discussing this interest as articulated in 1917 by Charles Evans Hughes). 
 58. See Ruhl & Salzman, Presidential Exit, supra note 14, at 1731–32, 1746 n.83; cf. FCC 
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 530 (2009) (upholding turn to broader FCC 
application of broadcast indecency policies); Metzger, supra note 25, at 483–84 (critiquing Fox). 
While this Article’s approach would have required more exacting review in Fox, a full analysis 
of that case is beyond this Article’s scope.  
 59. An agency’s rules governing the ability of an entity to broadcast speech would also fit 
under this rubric. But see Fox, 556 U.S. at 515–16 (asserting that an agency’s pivot to more 
vigorous regulation of allegedly indecent speech on public broadcasts, while it touched on matters 
governed by the First Amendment, did not necessarily require additional justification under the 
APA, if the agency action was itself constitutional).  
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rescission discrimination, or disruption of collaborative endeavors 
involving both the direct subject of regulation and third parties. This 
creates a narrow subset of changes subject to constraint. Most regulatory 
changes, including those addressing regulation of industrial, commercial, 
or financial processes, do not constitute threshold rescissions.  
As an example of a threshold rescission, consider President Woodrow 
Wilson’s efforts to segregate federal officials. Until the Wilson 
Administration, the federal civil service had been racially integrated since 
the nineteenth century.60 This institutional commitment to racial 
integration reflected a distinctively administrative commitment to 
equality, since courts had signaled by 1896 that government segregation 
was constitutional.61 Wilson forcefully resegregated the federal 
government, fundamentally changing working conditions on the basis of 
race.62 Pivoting back toward equality, after World War II President Harry 
Truman changed the military’s threshold institutional criteria when he 
required racial integration of U.S. armed forces.63 Congress did not 
mandate this, 64 and the Supreme Court did not prohibit segregation in 
public schools until several years later.65 One can understand former 
Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s lifting of the ban on transgender 
individuals in the same light.66 Former Defense Secretary Mattis’s 
restrictions on transgender service in and accession to the armed forces 
count as a partial threshold rescission of Carter’s policy.67 
There are three reasons that threshold rescissions warrant higher 
scrutiny than other measures, even absent proof that such rescissions 
involved the intent to discriminate against a suspect or quasi-suspect class 
defined by race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, or national 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in 
Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797, 800 (1998).  
 61. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 62. See Bernstein, supra note 60. 
 63. See Robert Knowles, The Intertwined Fates of Affirmative Action and the Military, 45 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1027, 1049 (2014).  
 64.  Theo Lippman, Jr., For Truman, Desegregation Was a Political Move, BALT. SUN 
(Aug. 9, 1998), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1998-08-09-1998221064-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/LML3-P2X3] (“[I]n February 1948, Truman called on Congress for ‘modern, 
comprehensive civil rights laws.’ Congress more or less ignored that, so black leaders called for 
executive action.”). 
 65. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.  
 66. See Press Release, Dep’t of Def., Secretary of Defense Ash Carter Announces Policy 
on Transgender Service Members (June 30, 2016), https://dod.defense.gov/News/News-
Releases/News-Release-View/Article/821675/secretary-of-defense-ash-carter-announces-policy 
-for-transgender-service-members/ [https://perma.cc/6XBJ-MPYT].  
 67. See Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, supra note 2. 
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origin.68 First, threshold rescissions adversely affect reliance interests. 
Second, they typically do not pose the same threat to institutional 
competence posed by review of other rescissions. Third, threshold rules 
that a new administration seeks to rescind often have substantial support 
in the legislative sphere, demonstrating a significant degree of 
congressional acquiescence. This Article considers each in turn.  
Many threshold rescissions leave orphan groups in their wake, which 
had received access or other goods under a previous expansion of 
threshold criteria. A rescission will prejudice the interests of such groups. 
Consider again President Wilson’s resegregation of the federal 
government. 69  
While African-American officeholders were not formally terminated, 
a cluster of related measures made them unwelcome.70 In some cases, 
senior officials pursuing Wilson’s policy shifted African-American civil 
servants into separate units that were later eliminated.71 Transfers were 
particularly common when African-American men had previously 
supervised white female civil servants.72 A number of the most prominent 
African-American officials retired shortly after the segregationist 
policies’ implementation.73 Within the Wilson Administration, officials 
justified these adverse impacts not by overt appeals to animus, but instead 
by references to the supposed “friction” between the races that 
segregation would ease.74 Nevertheless, the signal received by white 
middle managers in the administration was clear: “Forces defending 
racial equality . . . gave way to long-latent desires for discrimination.”75 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Under current doctrine, heightened scrutiny would require either an express 
classification based on suspect or quasi-suspect criteria, proof of intentional discrimination when 
express discrimination was absent, or interference with fundamental rights such as voting. See 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (requiring proof of discriminatory purpose). See 
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59 (2017) 
(discussing doctrine dividing scrutiny into tiers depending on the nature of the classification at 
issue). 
 69. Nancy J. Weiss, The Negro and the New Freedom: Fighting Wilsonian Segregation, 84 
POL. SCI. Q. 61, 61 (1969). 
 70. See generally, e.g., id. (discussing racially charged measures undertaken by the Wilson 
administration). 
 71. See id. at 64. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 66. 
 74. Id. at 71 (“Wilson, dismissing any political considerations, ‘said that the policy of 
segregation had been enforced for the comfort and best interests of both races in order to overcome 
friction.’”). See generally Christine A. Lunardini, Standing Firm: William Monroe Trotter’s 
Meetings with Woodrow Wilson, 1913–1914, 64 J. NEGRO HIST. 244 (1979) (listing the 
conversations President Wilson had with William Monroe Trotter on the Wilson Administration’s 
“justifications”). 
 75. Weiss, supra note 69, at 65.  
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Grandfathering in the subjects of a Wilsonian threshold rescission is 
a necessary but insufficient safeguard for reliance interests. In the Wilson 
example, African-American civil servants were nominally allowed to 
keep their jobs.76 Nevertheless, they were subjected to an array of 
measures, formal and informal, that made their position virtually 
impossible to maintain.77 In today’s transgender exclusion context, the 
Mattis memorandum’s grandfathering of certain current service members 
will not prevent other exclusionary measures, ranging from transfers to 
an atmosphere of indignities that recalls the treatment of African-
American civil servants in the Wilson Administration.78 In both cases, the 
rescission itself is a strong signal that senior officials have no interest in 
enforcing the rights of the orphaned group. That signal will empower 
others within the institution to act on their most invidious instincts and 
discourage members of the institution who seek to live up to both the 
letter and spirit of the military’s “commitment.”  
In other contexts, even if reliance interests are less acute, a threshold 
rescission will impose severe direct and collateral impacts. In the census 
context, shifts in questions can depress the count, shifting apportionment 
of political representatives and skewing other metrics based on the count, 
including those shaping government funding, business planning, 
philanthropic giving, and scholarship.79 The rescission of benefits such 
as DACA and TPS can affect individuals who have embarked on life 
plans such as higher education or skilled employment; it can also affect 
individuals or entities who have collaborated with the recipient on such 
projects.80 
Two other factors support a heightened standard of review for 
rescissions: institutional competence and legislative acquiescence. First 
consider institutional competence.81 In a venerable justification for 
judicial deference, particularly in areas such as national security and 
foreign affairs, courts assert that they lack access to information about the 
questions at issue, while the political branches have many more resources 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See id. at 64. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See Alan Okros & Denise Scott, Gender Identity in the Canadian Forces: A Review of 
Possible Impacts on Operational Effectiveness, 41 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 243, 251–52 (2014) 
(discussing “hostile unit climates” in the Canadian military and the lack of decisive response by 
commanders).  
 79. See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 315 F. Supp. 3d 766, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 80. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 491 (9th Cir. 
2018); Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
 81. See Chesney, supra note 7, at 1374.  
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available to get the facts. Confronting this asymmetry in information, 
courts are reluctant to second-guess the executive branch.82  
In rescission cases, there is reason to relax concerns about institutional 
competence. In such cases, an administration has already used its 
factfinding capabilities to explore a problem, canvas alternatives, and 
reach a decision. In the administrative state, few decisions are made 
overnight. Rather, administrators often—particularly in the national 
security arena—have to participate in an interagency process that 
jettisons bad ideas and refines good ones.83 Moreover, because an agency 
often embodies many schools of thought and also brokers the interests of 
external stakeholders, an action that is actually announced and 
implemented—even in part—reflects a critical mass of disparate actors.84 
In addition, many actors and stakeholders have their own pet projects, 
which compete with the action at issue. An action that becomes official 
policy has to compete successfully for agency attention with many other 
compelling alternative projects. Because of these obstacles, some strong 
arguments have to favor a proposal that reaches the status of an 
announced and implemented decision.  
Consider in this regard the inclusive transgender policy announced in 
2016 by Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter.85 That policy was supported 
by a lengthy report from the Rand Corporation, a longtime consultant to 
                                                                                                                 
 82. When Congress delegates power to an agency to decide an issue, that delegation 
provides an additional basis for deference. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018); 
see also Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of 
Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 455, 457 (2012) (explaining the Court’s willingness to defer to 
Congress’s restrictions on material support to foreign terrorist groups, even when statute affected 
content of speech).  
 83. See Robert F. Bauer, The National Security Lawyer, In Crisis: When the “Best View” 
of the Law May Not Be the Best View, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 239–40 (2018) (discussing 
issue of the process regarding the provision of legal advice to the executive branch); see also Mary 
DeRosa, National Security Lawyering: The Best View of the Law as a Regulative Ideal, 31 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 277, 291–92 (2018) (discussing “Lawyers Group[s]” that customarily met on an 
interagency basis to discuss national security issues); Christopher Fonzone & Dana Remus, What 
About When the Best View Is the Best View?, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305, 315–18 (2018) 
(discussing elaborate structures for dialogue and accountability within the executive branch); 
Ingber, supra note 37; see also Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 2187, 2206–08 (2018) (discussing formal and informal protocols and procedures within 
executive branch). See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE 
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012) (discussing the actions taken by the executive branch after 9/11).  
 84. See Ingber, supra note 37, at 143; Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: 
Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2417 (2006); Rao, 
supra note 37, at 275; Mila Sohoni, The Administrative Constitution in Exile, 57 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 923, 939–40 (2016); cf. Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-
Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 408 (2016) (suggesting cycles in judicial willingness 
to rely on the executive branch’s internal checks).  
 85. See Press Release, Dep’t of Def., supra note 66. 
19
Margulies: Rescinding Inclusion in the Administrative State: Adjudicating DA
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1448 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
the government on a broad spectrum of issues, including many former 
government officials.86 Secretary Carter’s decision to relax the longtime 
ban on transgender personnel’s accession to or retention in the military 
also had to win approval from the various services and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. To be sure, this is not a formal requirement in the U.S. 
Department of Defense (the DoD), given the constitutional imperative of 
civilian control.87 Some dissent is certainly possible, and was indeed 
actually present in the transgender inclusion context.88 Nevertheless, as a 
practical matter, promulgating a measure over the assiduous opposition 
of a majority of senior general officers would be difficult, especially 
given the need for the military to implement an inclusive directive in 
addition to the prospect of hostile senior officers reaching out to allies in 
Congress and the media.89 Such opposition does not occur frequently and 
is fraught with peril for its participants,90 but the prospect of such 
opposition will often stymie proposals that lack a coherent rationale, 
compelling evidence, and an elevated spot in senior political appointees’ 
priorities. A court reviewing a rescission of that agency measure has some 
degree of confidence that the measure slated for rescission was at least 
not outlandish, rife with unintended consequences, or wholly lacking in 
political or bureaucratic support.91 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See generally AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., RAND CORP., ASSESSING THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOWING TRANSGENDER PERSONNEL TO SERVE OPENLY (2016), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1530.html [https://perma.cc/4YJ7-Z2WA] 
(assessing the U.S. Department of Defense’s policy regarding transgender persons serving in the 
military while undergoing transition-related treatment). 
 87. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 797, 801 (2012) (analyzing inherent problems with civilian controls over the 
military). 
 88. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY SERVICE BY 
TRANSGENDER PERSONS 44 (2018) (citing views of senior general officers approving the rollback 
of Secretary Carter’s policy, supporting the inference that at least some senior generals had 
disagreed with Secretary Carter’s change).  
 89. See Pearlstein, supra note 87, at 799–800 (discussing the pervasive involvement of the 
military in defense policy formation and the political interactions of some senior military leaders). 
 90. Id. at 799 n.7 (discussing the firing of General Stanley McChrystal for publicly 
disagreeing with official policy and casting aspersions on senior civilian officials). 
 91. Of course, such characterizations may also be true of rescissions. Cf. Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2404 (2018) (crediting the “worldwide review” with giving rise to the third 
iteration of President Trump’s travel ban). However, decisions in the Trump Administration often 
do not receive such vetting, at least when they are of personal interest to President Trump. See, 
e.g., James Goldgeier & Elizabeth N. Saunders, The Unconstrained Presidency: Checks and 
Balances Eroded Long Before Trump, FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.foreign 
affairs.com/articles/2018-08-13/unconstrained-presidency?utm_campaign=reg_conf_email& 
utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fa_registration [https://perma.cc/BV7L-LL6B] (“In the 
age of Donald Trump, it often feels as though one individual has the power to chart the United 
States’ course in the world all by himself.”). In these situations, senior advisors are often relegated 
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Similarly, a policy already in place often has backing in Congress. 
Admittedly, that backing may not be sufficient to result in an express 
codification of the policy. Moreover, some legislators may oppose the 
policy and do so vocally. However, many policies so enacted will have 
firm bipartisan support.92 That increases the likelihood that such policies 
will eventually take their place in Justice Robert Jackson’s familiar 
typology as measures taken against a backdrop of congressional silence.93 
In the short term, Congress’s response may not move the Youngstown 
needle sufficiently to establish the prior policy’s lawfulness. However, 
the absence of clear, consistent, and substantial congressional opposition 
to an announced policy does at least provide some indicia that the policy 
has wide support.  
C.  Threshold Rescission and the Importance of Means–Ends Scrutiny 
Because of these factors, a threshold rescission should be subject to 
intermediate scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, courts will determine 
if a given measure is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest.”94 This test of fit between means and ends will 
ensure that adequate deliberation supports threshold rescissions.  
Requiring a fit between ends and means encourages deliberation and 
guards against the short-term thinking that distressed the Framers.95 The 
Framers were well-acquainted with the thought of Aristotle and other 
classical theorists96 who regarded means–ends fit as integral to practical 
judgment.97 As Alexander Hamilton observed, courts using practical 
                                                                                                                 
to triage and improvisation, stopping some highly imprudent moves and delaying others, while of 
necessity permitting the implementation of some decisions that a more comprehensive vetting 
process would catch. See Peter Margulies, Legal Dilemmas Facing White House Counsel in the 
Trump Administration: The Costs of Public Disclosure of FISA Requests, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1913, 1929–31 (2019). In any case, under the model proposed in this Article, it seems reasonable 
to believe that the proof is in the pudding: If a threshold rescission passes means–ends scrutiny, a 
court should uphold it. If not, a court should restore the status quo prior to the rescission.  
 92. See Johnson, supra note 33, at 368 (discussing DACA’s bipartisan congressional 
backing).  
 93. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
 94. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (quoting McCullen v. 
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014)).  
 95. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (suggesting that judicial review 
could temper influence of short-term “ill humors” on the political branches). 
 96. Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 203 (Penguin Books 1990) (1977) (noting the 
Framers’ affinity for classical thought). 
 97. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 152 (Martin Ostwald trans., The Bobbs-Merrill 
Co., Inc. 1962) (“[T]he capacity of deliberating well about what is good and advantageous for 
oneself is . . . typical of . . . practical wisdom . . . . This is shown by the fact that we speak of men 
as having practical wisdom in a particular respect . . . when they calculate well with respect to 
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judgment to assess constitutionality also yield vital ex ante benefits for 
political officials, prodding them to tailor proposed actions to forestall 
judicial invalidation.98  
As an example of means–ends scrutiny that nominally only required 
a “rational relationship” between means and ends but was in fact more 
robust, consider City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.99 In 
Cleburne, the Supreme Court struck down a local ordinance that 
mandated that operators of a proposed group home for persons with 
mental retardation receive a special permit.100 The Court discerned a lack 
of means–ends fit in the ordinance because the town’s method for 
fulfilling its goals ignored a great deal of activity that appeared 
inconsistent with those goals. For example, the town justified requiring a 
special permit by citing increased traffic and congestion.101 However, the 
ordinance did not require a special permit requirement for other uses, 
including fraternity houses, dormitories, and hospitals.102 This gap in the 
special permit scheme showed that the town had not tailored means to 
goals. 
The Court has also employed robust means–ends scrutiny in the 
context of citizenship law, closer to the national security and foreign 
relations focus of this Article. In Sessions v. Morales-Santana,103 the 
Court struck down a provision that favored mothers over fathers 
regarding citizenship acquired at birth by a child born out of wedlock 
                                                                                                                 
some worthwhile end . . . .”); see also Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty: Judicial 
Review of Immigration Law in the Trump Administration, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2018) 
(discussing the Framers’ view of means–ends scrutiny and applying that approach to immigration 
law). 
 98. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the prospect of judicial 
review will encourage political actors to “qualify”—i.e., limit—their efforts to enact unjust 
measures).  
 99. 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see Peter Margulies, The Travel Ban Decision, Administrative 
Law, and Judicial Method: Taking Statutory Context Seriously, 33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 159, 178–
79 (discussing flaws in the Supreme Court’s use of Cleburne in Trump v. Hawaii to justify 
upholding President Trump’s travel ban). Katie Eyer has written extensively on the complexities 
and contradictions of the Court’s tiered system of review, under which nominally minimal review 
can sometimes be actually robust, as in Cleburne, and lack of proof of intent can stall heightened 
scrutiny. See generally, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, Animus Trouble, 48 STETSON L. REV. 215 (2019) 
(arguing that progressives ought to be concerned about scholarly efforts to systematize the animus 
doctrine). 
 100. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448–50 (1985)).  
 101. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. 
 102. Id.  
 103. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017); cf. Kristin A. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family in 
Morales-Santana, 131 HARV. L. REV. 170, 204–06 (2017) (arguing that the decision could set the 
stage for rethinking judicial deference on immigration); Margulies, supra note 97, at 19–21 
(analyzing Morales-Santana). 
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abroad to a U.S. and foreign national.104 According to Justice Ruth 
Ginsburg, who wrote for the Court, the provision’s lack of means–ends 
fit was fatal.105 If Congress wished to ensure that a child born abroad was 
“American in character” and thus merited citizenship,106 requiring 
prolonged U.S. presence by the parent would show the parent’s 
investment in the child’s American identity.107 Nevertheless, mandating 
prolonged U.S. presence for a U.S. citizen father but not a U.S. citizen 
mother “scarcely serve[s] the posited end.”108 In the absence of means–
ends fit, the Court struck down the acquired citizenship provision.109  
However, in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court’s means–ends review was 
far more deferential.110 In an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, the 
Court upheld President Trump’s travel ban on certain majority-Muslim 
countries.111 Illustrating its lack of means–ends fit, the ban covered a 
range of individuals, including young children, whose entry into the 
United States could not possibly endanger the national security of the 
United States.112 Moreover, the ban cited the need to ensure appropriate 
identity management steps by the countries that the ban covered, even 
though some of those countries had strong track records in this area and 
over one hundred countries with poor records were not covered by the 
ban.113 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1682, 1698, 1700–01. 
 105. Id. at 1690 (“The defender of legislation that differentiates on the basis of gender must 
show ‘at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and 
that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 
(1996))). 
 106. Id. at 1692 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 6172 before the H. Comm. on Immigration and 
Naturalization, 76th Cong. 431, 426–27 (1939)). See generally Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate 
Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 
YALE L.J. 2134 (2014) (discussing the constitutionality of immigration statutes governing the 
citizenship status of children born to American parents outside the United States that discriminate 
between mother and father). 
 107. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1692 (rooting presence requirements in reasonable 
congressional desire to ensure that a U.S. citizen parent could “counteract the influence of the 
alien parent”); id. at 1695 (assuming that Congress wished to “ensur[e] a connection between the 
foreign-born nonmarital child and the United States”). 
 108. Id. at 1695. 
 109. Id. at 1701. 
 110. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018).  
 111. Id. at 2423. The ban also extended to North Korea, which does not let its nationals leave 
its own territory, and Venezuela—the latter restriction dealing only with members of the Maduro 
regime and their family members and associates. See id. at 2405–06.  
 112. See id. at 2445 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 113. See id. at 2404 (majority opinion); cf. Margulies, supra note 97, at 63–65 (discussing 
the travel ban proclamation’s weak links between the ban and interests such as identity 
management); Margulies, supra note 99, at 18 (analyzing the decision’s loose conception of 
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The approach this Article takes requires a more robust brand of 
means–ends scrutiny than the Court employed in the travel ban case. 
Within that framework, an agency can argue that the rescission serves 
administrative constitutionalism by fulfilling the government’s 
responsibility, preserving the separation of powers, or protecting other 
groups’ rights. However, a reviewing court should carefully scrutinize 
such claims.  
II.  THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S NEW RESTRICTIONS ON 
TRANSGENDER MILITARY SERVICE: OF FALSE STARTS AND 
GRANDFATHERED ORPHANS  
The Trump Administration’s restrictions on transgender military 
service roll back an expansion of transgender access and retention set in 
motion under the Obama Administration. In grandfathering in certain 
transgender service members, the new restrictions actually incorporate 
some of the same elements proposed in this Article. Moreover, courts 
assessing the new restrictions will need to acknowledge the deference that 
military judgments have traditionally received.114 Nevertheless, as 
Section II.A shows, some of the new restrictions fail to comply with the 
Constitution.  
A.  Secretary Carter’s Constitutionalist Vision 
Secretary Carter’s inclusive policy incorporated both a vision of the 
Constitution and a path to implementing transgender inclusion that 
provided sound guidance to commanders.115 Justifying the policy, 
Secretary Carter stated the commitment to inclusion in terms of military 
effectiveness. As Secretary Carter asserted, the U.S. military needs “all 
available talent in order to remain the finest fighting force the world has 
ever known.”116 The military’s “mission . . . to defend this country” 
requires taking down “barriers unrelated to a person’s qualification to 
                                                                                                                 
means–ends fit); David Bier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria, 
CATO INST. (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/travel-ban-based-executive-whim-not-
objective-criteria [https://perma.cc/5PZC-HL8V] (describing the decision’s means–ends fit). 
 114. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981); Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 917 F.3d 
694, 719–20 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Williams, J., concurring) (explaining the rationale for judicial 
deference). 
 115. Secretary Carter’s initiative called for phasing in the new rules on the accession of 
transgender individuals to the military. See Press Release, Dep’t of Def., supra note 66. These 
rules were supposed to take effect in 2017. See id. President Trump first delayed implementation 
of the new rules and then rescinded them after issuance of the 2018 Defense Report and Secretary 
Mattis’s recommendations. See Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, supra note 2.  
 116. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., TRANSGENDER SERVICE IN THE U.S. MILITARY: AN 
IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK 10 (2016) (emphasis added).  
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serve.”117 The nod to equality here affirmed that inclusion is a 
fundamental value in the U.S. constitutional system; the military, as an 
integral part of that system, benefits from sharing those values. Indeed, 
in certain contexts, including racial integration, the military has been a 
leader, sending signals that the rest of society has followed.118  
1.  Transgender Personnel Currently Serve in the Military 
Under Secretary Carter’s initiative, responsibility and inclusion were 
not merely abstractions—they were pragmatic. As the Department of 
Defense Handbook noted, “[t]here are transgender Service members in 
uniform today.”119 In other words, even if Secretary Carter had done 
nothing to ease restrictions on transgender accession and retention, the 
military would still confront challenges regarding the integration of 
transgender persons. 
In addressing those challenges, Secretary Carter understood that 
prejudice against transgender persons is dynamic, not static. As the 
military has discovered with its easing or elimination of restrictions based 
on race, gender, and sexual orientation, attitudes can broaden “over 
time.”120 A pragmatic understanding of human institutions acknowledges 
the inevitability of change. 
2.  Responsibility and Guidance in the Carter Policy 
Secretary Carter’s policy was also mindful of both the government’s 
responsibilities and the rights of others. Under Carter’s policy, rules for 
accession maintained substantial limits on prospective transgender 
service members. Since the rules required that a new recruit be stable and 
without significant clinical distress for eighteen months,121 Carter’s 
criteria screened out a substantial cohort of transgender persons who had 
experienced gender dysphoria within that period. Under the American 
Psychiatric Association’s compendium of clinical wisdom, the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5), “clinically significant 
distress” is a key symptom of gender dysphoria, which refers to a 
“marked incongruence” between expressed and assigned gender.122 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. at 7. 
 118. See AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 44; Knowles, supra note 63; 
Joseph Landau, Presidential Constitutionalism and Civil Rights, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1719, 
1762 (2014) (noting the Obama Administration’s successful effort to repeal the military’s “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy limiting gay and lesbian service). 
 119. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 116 (emphasis added). 
 120. AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 44. 
 121. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 116, at 40. 
 122. Marty Lederman, Untangling the Issues in the “Transgender in the Military” 
Litigation, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 7, 2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
25
Margulies: Rescinding Inclusion in the Administrative State: Adjudicating DA
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1454 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
Screening out prospective recruits who had exhibited significant distress 
within eighteen months of accession barred candidates whose conflicts 
between experienced and assigned gender could have impaired their 
ability to help accomplish the military’s mission. 
The Carter approach also entailed detailed guidance for commanders. 
This attention to detail began with the Rand report that provided the initial 
support for Carter’s initiative. While the 2018 Department of Defense 
Report (the 2018 Report) partially rolling back Carter’s policy faulted 
Rand for a misleadingly rosy view of the literature on other militaries’ 
experience,123 the Rand report’s authors actually acknowledged shortfalls 
in the practice of America’s allies, including Canada.124 The Department 
of Defense Handbook implementing Carter’s changes did not stint on 
details. It included a cornucopia of hypotheticals that provided sensible 
guidance to commanders, particularly on managing accommodations for 
transgender persons that might touch on countervailing rights such as the 
privacy and dignity of non-transgender service members.125   
3.  Taking Statistics Seriously: Low Base Rates for 
Transgender Personnel 
Lastly, the Carter policy relied on estimated low base rates for 
transgender recruits to discount both monetary costs and disruption in 
deployments that the military would experience because of transgender 
exclusion.126 Rand used estimates of the incidence of transgender status 
in the military that pegged that number as higher than it would be in the 
                                                                                                                 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-5) (5th ed. 2013)), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/62128/untangling-issues-transgender-military-litigation/ [https:// 
perma.cc/8FEC-5DMJ]. Marty Lederman has authored an exceptionally insightful and 
comprehensive study of differences and overlaps between the Carter and Mattis policies that 
explains the core treatment and diagnostic concepts. See id.  
 123. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 88, at 40. 
 124. See AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 62–63 (noting that a Canadian 
study documented persistence of harassment of transgender service members); id. at 63 (noting 
that Canada’s initial policy was “too vague and lacked sufficient details” and reporting that the 
newly revised Canadian policy had garnered positive responses). 
 125. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 116, at 63 (providing guidance on 
administering a swim test involving fully transitioned male service member who retained female 
secondary sexual characteristics, including the sensible suggestion that everyone wear a shirt). In 
addressing shower protocol, the Department of Defense Handbook recommended common-sense 
steps such as installing shower curtains and placing towel and clothing hooks within individual 
stalls as well as staggering shower times. Id. at 60–61. 
 126. AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 34–35. A base rate is the overall 
percentage that a particular phenomenon comprises in a particular population. See Drew Boyd, 
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general population.127 Based on that extreme figure—which is still low 
overall—Rand estimated that the net increased cost of transition-related 
health care for the entire U.S. military would be a maximum of $8.4 
million.128 
That figure translates into an infinitesimal increase in the military’s 
overall health care costs. Estimating the relative increase in health care 
costs for a large entity like the U.S. military also requires estimating the 
total health care costs of that entity. Based on 2015 estimates, the U.S. 
military spends $6.2 billion on health care annually, including expenses 
related to mental health, pregnancy of service members and their 
dependents, and a host of other long- and short-term conditions.129 Rand’s 
worst-case projection of transition-related health costs—$8.4 million—
would represent a paltry 0.13% of the military’s total health care 
budget.130 Put another way, if an individual paid a health insurance 
premium of $1,000, the added coverage of transition-related care would 
cost that subscriber an additional $1.30.  
The same focus on base rates illustrates the minimal effect an 
inclusive transgender policy would have on deployment. Of course, the 
ability to deploy readily is a central attribute for an effective military. A 
key metric for measuring disruption in employment is the labor year: the 
time spent on work by an employee annually. As a large entity, the U.S. 
military has a very high total for aggregate labor years: 1.2 million.131 As 
of 2015, the active duty component of the U.S. Army alone already had 
50,000 soldiers who were not deployable due to medical, legal, and 
administrative factors.132 That total amounted to 14% of the active duty 
Army, and 5,300 labor years.133 In other words, approximately one out of 
seven active duty Army personnel was unavailable to deploy for all or a 
significant part of the preceding year. In contrast, even extreme estimates 
of labor years lost because of transition-related medical treatment 
amounted to no more than a total of forty-three, and could be as few as 
eight.134 In a small number of “unique military occupation[s],” such as a 
fighter pilot that might involve “frequent, unpredicted mobilizations,” a 
high incidence of serious medical procedures would in fact disrupt 
                                                                                                                 
 127.  AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 35 (using the higher figure because 
the military is disproportionately male and male-to-female transition is more common in the 
general population). 
 128. Id. at 36. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 42. 
 132. Id. at 46. 
 133. Id. at 46–47. 
 134. Id. at 42 (noting this was in part because only a small number of transgender service 
members actually undergo medical procedures that would affect deployability). 
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deployment.135 If everyone in an aviation unit required a transfer, that 
would obviously affect combat readiness. But the low incidence of 
transgender personnel reduces this risk to virtually zero. 
The high incidence of nondeployability in the U.S. military 
independent of transition treatment highlights a final facet of 
responsibility alluded to earlier: transgender individuals already serve in 
the military and have done so for a long time. However, under the 
transgender ban they could not do so openly. As a corollary to this covert 
existence, transgender service members were at greater risk for suicide 
and mental illness.136 Barring treatment for transitions caused human 
tragedies and increased costs for conditions caused by the absence of 
treatment and acceptance. Secretary Carter acknowledged these human 
and financial costs. 
B.  The Mattis Policy’s Constitutionalist Response 
The 2018 Mattis policy’s administrative constitutionalist vision did 
not adequately support its partial rescission of Carter’s policy. Because 
the rescission is partial, not plenary, further unpacking of the 2018 policy 
is useful. Several of the 2018 departures from the Carter policy fail the 
test of means–ends fit, including the policy’s refusal to allow 
accommodations in bunking, bathroom use, and showering for service 
members who have received a diagnosis of gender dysphoria after the 
effective date of the 2018 policy.137 However, the Mattis policy 
appropriately grandfathered in current service members who have 
already received a diagnosis of gender dysphoria in reliance on the Carter 
policy, including those who had planned medical procedures.138 
Moreover, the Mattis policy did not restrict accession and retention of 
all transgender individuals because it grandfathered in certain medically 
transitioning personnel and was open to individuals who identified with 
a gender other than their assigned one but did not suffer from gender 
dysphoria.139 In addition, one element of the Mattis policy’s change in 
accession criteria—extending from eighteen to thirty-six months the time 
that candidates with gender dysphoria must be stable prior to accession—
is a difference from the Carter policy in degree, but not in kind. For this 
reason, this Article concludes that courts should disaggregate the 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Id. at 43. 
 136. Id. at 9–10. 
 137. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 88, at 42. 
 138. See Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 917 F.3d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Wilkins, J., concurring) 
(noting that the Mattis policy was not a total ban on transgender accession and retention and 
detailing its differences from President Trump’s original tweet on this subject).  
 139. Id.; see also id. at 701 (agreeing that Mattis policy did not constitute a total transgender 
ban); Lederman, supra note 122 (citing to the Shanahan decisions). 
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components of the Mattis policy and separately review their respective 
means–ends fit. 
Before disaggregating those components, it is useful to more fully 
discuss the Mattis policy’s reasoning, as articulated in the 2018 Report. 
Regarding its refusal to allow accommodations in bunking, bathroom use, 
and showering, the 2018 Report invoked the “reasonable expectations of 
privacy” of non-transgender service members and the DoD’s 
responsibility to ensure “good order and discipline.”140 The 2018 Report 
stated that the Carter policy and the Rand report supporting that policy 
unduly discounted the “conflicting interests” that an inclusive 
transgender policy would set in motion, as well as the “significant effort 
required of commanders” to address those issues.141 These effects would 
impair unit cohesion, “degrad[ing] an otherwise highly functioning 
team.”142 Moreover, the 2018 Report declared, the Rand report’s citation 
to positive experiences with transgender inclusion in other militaries, 
such as Canada’s, had failed to acknowledge the problems remaining in 
those entities.143 Finally, the 2018 Report asserted that the Carter policy 
failed to adequately address the “[d]isproportionate” medical costs of 
inclusion and the increased risk of suicidal behavior.144  
As a first step in addressing these concerns, the 2018 Report echoes 
the Carter policy by imposing limits on accession for unstable candidates. 
The Carter policy required a showing of eighteen months of stability prior 
to accession, while the 2018 policy doubles that amount to thirty-six 
months. In both cases, the stability criterion is designed to bar individuals 
most likely to impose costs and present challenges to commanders. The 
doubling of time in the Mattis policy is a difference in degree only. 
Because the stability requirement will screen out many individuals, the 
Carter and Mattis policies differ principally in how they handle the 
residual cases.  
1.  The Mattis Policy’s Partial Rollback 
The Mattis policy also does not restrict all transgender individuals 
going forward. Outside of the grandfathered group, its principal impact 
is on those with gender dysphoria and on persons seeking to join the 
military who have already fully transitioned through medical treatment 
or otherwise. The DSM-5 of the American Psychiatric Association 
recognizes persons as transgender if they feel a need to express 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 88, at 36.  
 141. Id. at 38. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 40. 
 144. Id. at 41 (discussing medical costs) (emphasis omitted); see id. at 21 (discussing suicide 
risk). 
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themselves in a gender other than their assigned gender, even if that 
feeling does not rise to the level of gender dysphoria.145 The 2018 policy 
would allow persons with that need to serve, as long as they could comply 
with the standards imposed on their assigned gender.146 Because the 2018 
policy does not bar accession or retention of all transgender individuals, 
under the traditional equal protection approach courts would employ only 
rational basis review, which the policy could most likely pass. However, 
the more rigorous review proposed in this Article would lead to a 
different result, at least for certain aspects of the Mattis policy.  
2.  The Mattis Policy and Means–Ends Fit 
Significant parts of the Mattis policy lack means–ends fit. These 
include the bar on retention of individuals who in the future require either 
transition-related medical services or accommodations in bunking, 
bathroom use, and showering. Another vulnerable component is the bar 
on accession of individuals who have already completed a medical 
transition. These contexts provide the clearest contrasts to the Carter 
policy.  
Lack of means–ends fit is a problem for the 2018 Mattis Policy’s bar 
on retention of individuals requiring future medical procedures. The 2018 
Report cites current data on the costs of such procedures to support its 
recommended changes to the Carter policy.147 While the data included in 
the 2018 Report indicates a cost increase due to inclusion, that data 
reveals less than meets the eye. The “headline” in the 2018 data is a 300% 
increase in “medical costs” for service members with gender 
dysphoria.148 But the 2018 Report fails to provide crucial context, such 
as countervailing costs, low base rates for transgender individuals in the 
military, low absolute costs, and very low relative costs of transgender 
medical treatment, as compared with the military’s overall medical 
expenditures.149  
An assessment of countervailing costs highlights a point that the 
Carter policy takes as a fundamental premise but the Mattis policy 
downplays: transgender people—even apart from the group wisely 
grandfathered in under the new policy—are already in our military and 
                                                                                                                 
 145. See Lederman, supra note 122 (outlining the American Psychiatric Association’s 
recognition of transgender persons’ need to express themselves in a gender other than their 
assigned gender at birth). 
 146. See Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 917 F.3d 694, 699–700 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Wilkins, J., 
concurring). 
 147. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 88, at 41. Waivers are also possible, but the military will 
presumably be sparing in granting them. See id. at 42. 
 148. Id. at 41. 
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 126–130.  
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will be there in the future, experiencing needs that the military will have 
to address, one way or another. The 2018 Report’s 300% quote fails to 
specifically address the countervailing costs of both medical and non-
medical services delivered to persons already in the military who are 
transgender but have not yet acknowledged this publicly. Those 
individuals also seek treatment for a range of conditions, including 
depression, suicide attempts and ideation, and medical issues that serve 
as proxies for transgender treatments.150 There is no indication that the 
2018 Report factored in these countervailing costs avoided by inclusion.  
Indeed, the 2018 Report’s approach to the issue of suicide among 
transgender individuals demonstrates its failure to address the problems 
of transgender individuals who already serve. The Rand report 
demonstrates that suicide is a heightened risk for individuals who do not 
serve openly.151 Studies show that the absence of acceptance is a prime 
contributor to suicide in this cohort.152 Restrictive policies in the military 
are another link in that chain. Suicide among transgender individuals is 
not a new problem ushered in by inclusion; it is an old problem that 
restrictive policies exacerbate. The Carter policy acknowledged this 
concern; the 2018 Report unduly discounted it.  
The 2018 Report’s failure to fully address the problems of already-
serving transgender personnel also undermines the recommended bar on 
retention of individuals who require accommodations in bunking, 
bathroom use, and showering. Here, too, the 2018 Report fails to 
acknowledge that base rates for such issues will be quite low, and that 
measures such as the thirty-six-month stability requirement for accession 
will drive these rates down even further. A complete report would have 
directly compared these low levels of disruption with the higher levels of 
treatment for depression and other conditions that covert transgender 
personnel already require, which also disrupt unit cohesion and combat 
readiness. In addition, the 2018 Report should have fully acknowledged 
the very specific guidance on privacy that Secretary Carter provided in 
the Department of Defense Handbook, including recommendations on 
subdividing showers and staggering shower times.153 While the 2018 
Report warns of significant effort expended by commanders, the 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 9–10, 33–34 (discussing the 
range of costs that transgender inclusion would markedly reduce and providing the example of an 
individual who sought and received breast reduction due to back pain as a proxy for treatment 
attributed to gender transition).  
 151. Id. at 9–10.  
 152. See Raymond P. Tucker et al., Current and Military-Specific Gender Minority Stress 
Factors and Their Relationship with Suicide Ideation in Transgender Veterans, 49 SUICIDE & 
LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 155, 155–56 (2019). 
 153. See supra notes 137–140 and accompanying text. 
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straightforward advice in the Department of Defense Handbook answers 
most reasonable questions.154  
For the same reasons, the 2018 Mattis policy’s bar on accession of 
already-transitioned candidates fails intermediate scrutiny. This policy 
may serve the military’s legitimate “interest in uniformity.”155 In this 
sense, the 2018 policy echoes earlier case law deferring to military 
judgments about qualifications and apparel.156 However, given the 
importance of contributions that transitioned transgender individuals can 
make and the costs of the old ban, those judgments should not overcome 
the force of Secretary Carter’s shift to a new paradigm.  
In sum, disaggregation is a useful exercise for evaluating the 2018 
Mattis policy. The thirty-six-month stability requirement prior to 
accession survives intermediate scrutiny. The ban on accession of 
completely transitioned candidates fails, as do the retention bars for those 
service members who require future accommodations or medical 
treatment. While the 2018 policy helpfully grandfathers in service 
members who have already planned medical treatments and allows the 
accession and retention of persons without gender dysphoria, the 
remaining Mattis restrictions lack means–ends fit. They may be sufficient 
under the relaxed standard that customarily applies in the absence of 
suspect or quasi-suspect classifications. However, under the approach 
taken here, those restrictions fail. 
                                                                                                                 
 154. The 2018 Report’s criticism of Carter’s policy on accommodations relied on isolated 
cases and misinterpretation of earlier guidance. The authors of the 2018 Report cited one case in 
which female members of a unit had complained about a showering accommodation for a 
transgender service member, who in turn had filed a complaint stating that the commander had 
not respected the transgender service member’s rights under the new policy. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., supra note 88, at 37. Such bumps in the road are common for implementation of any new 
paradigm. While some resistance to change is a given in the short term, resistance is not a static 
phenomenon; it can change over time. As Secretary Carter’s Department of Defense Handbook 
reflected, a clear response from commanders would greatly ease this process, as it did for the other 
changes that the military has managed in the last seventy-five years, including integration based 
on race, gender, and sexual orientation. See AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 
44.  
The 2018 Report also incorrectly asserted that the Rand report failed to note that foreign 
militaries such as Canada’s did not provide sufficient guidance. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra 
note 88, at 40–41. In fact, the Rand report expressly noted this problem. See AGNES GEREBEN 
SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 86, at 54 (noting that Canada’s initial policy “d[id] not . . . provide 
guidance” on balancing transgender service members’ need for accommodation and others’ 
privacy rights). Carter’s guidance on accommodations was a response to the initial problems that 
Canada’s experience revealed. The 2018 Report’s misinterpretation of earlier documents is one 
reason to accord it less deference than courts have traditionally employed.  
 155. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 88, at 38. 
 156. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507–10 (1986) (upholding military 
regulations requiring uniformity in headgear that, inter alia, barred wearing of a yarmulke by an 
observant Jew who served as a clinical psychologist on Air Force base).  
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III.  THE CENSUS CITIZENSHIP QUESTION AS A THRESHOLD RESCISSION 
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross’s attempt to include a citizenship 
question on the 2020 census also counts as a threshold rescission. While 
the Secretary of Commerce has broad discretion in questions surrounding 
the census count,157 the selection of questions is nonetheless part of the 
constitutional obligation of completing the census.158 The census 
influences apportionment, which in turn affects the contours of political 
representation. Here, the government could not show the means–ends fit 
to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.159  
A.  Past Practice on Asking the Citizenship Question 
In contrast with the military transgender policy, the policy that 
Secretary Ross rescinded did not start with President Obama. The Census 
Bureau last posed a citizenship question on the “short-form” census—the 
survey virtually everyone receives—in 1950.160 The premise for this 
longtime practice of omitting the short-form census citizenship question 
warrants further explanation. 
An accurate count includes the “whole number of persons.”161 The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) has consistently advised the Census Bureau 
that foreign nationals who are residents of the United States “must be 
included,” regardless of their immigration status.162 Indeed, as DOJ 
attorney—now a noted constitutional law professor—David A. Strauss 
advised Congress in 1980, “[t]he drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment,” 
which updated the census clause to reflect the freeing of enslaved people, 
“considered, and deliberately rejected, proposals that the apportionment 
of Representatives be based on the number of legal voters, or on the 
number of citizens. Historically, resident aliens of all varieties have been 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 2 (1996) (per curiam). 
 158. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  
 159. The challenges to Secretary Ross’s decision included both constitutional and APA 
claims. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2019). While the Court 
relied solely on the APA in upholding an injunction against the short-form census citizenship 
question, id. at 2574–76, this Article argues that the Court’s APA analysis paralleled the 
constitutional arguments made in this section. See infra notes 204–08 and accompanying text. 
 160.  Tamara Keith, Fact Check: Has Citizenship Been a Standard Census Question? NPR 
(Mar. 27, 2018, 8:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/27/597436512/fact-check-has-
citizenship-been-a-standard-census-question [https://perma.cc/PNE6-MTHP]. 
 161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  
 162. See Census Equity Act: Hearing on H.R. 2661 Before the Subcomm. on Census & 
Population of the H. Comm. on Post Office & Civil Serv., 101st Cong. 43 (1989) (testimony of C. 
Louis Kinkannon, Deputy Dir., U.S. Census Bureau) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2661]. 
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included in the population figures on which the allocation of 
Representatives was based.”163  
An inaccurate count of the “whole number of persons” would have 
significant collateral impacts. Suppose that a given method undermined 
“distributive accuracy”—a faithful comparative assessment of 
population in different sub-federal government subdivisions.164 That 
disparity could skew apportionment of seats in the House of 
Representatives and votes in the Electoral College, as well as state 
legislative seats.165 In addition, it could distort funding formulas used to 
allocate government money. Mistakes could also affect the giving of 
charitable foundations, the marketing strategies of corporations, and a 
long list of other activities. Those impacts merit care in the selection of 
questions that can affect participation rates.   
From a historical perspective, census officials have not always viewed 
a citizenship question as clashing with such concerns. As Secretary Ross 
correctly observed, the government for well over a century asked a 
question about citizenship.166 However, the government stopped asking 
that question almost sixty years ago.167 Successive generations of census 
officials have argued on a bipartisan basis that such an inquiry would chill 
responses by undocumented noncitizens and others born abroad or related 
to foreign nationals in the United States.168 
In preparation for the 1980 census, officials were gravely concerned 
about the prospect of “convincing undocumented immigrants that the 
                                                                                                                 
 163. 1980 Census: Counting Illegal Aliens: Hearing on S. 2366 Before the Subcomm. on 
Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, & Fed. Servs. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th 
Cong. 96 (1980) (testimony of David A. Strauss). However, the Supreme Court has never decided 
this issue.  
 164. Lyle Denniston, Does the Census Actually Count Everyone and Should It?, NAT’L 
CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (Mar. 12, 2019), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/does-the-census-
actually-count-everyone-and-should-it [https://perma.cc/T8G9-L5LA]. 
 165. Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1996) (per curiam). The Supreme 
Court has held that “distributive accuracy” is vital to the census’s role in apportionment. Id. at 20. 
In other words, a count featuring an overall error in estimating the United States population may 
not undermine the census’s purpose if that count correctly states the population ratios between 
different states. That latter comparative figure drives the apportionment process. See generally 
Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom to Count, and 
Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 755 (2011) (discussing principles applied by courts 
in census cases).  
 166. See Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, supra note 3, at 2; see also Dep’t of Commerce 
v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566–67 (2019) (discussing history of asking demographic 
questions on short-form census). 
 167. See Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, supra note 3, at 2. 
 168. See Hearing on H.R. 2661, supra note 162, at 43–44 (observing that a citizenship 
question could “seriously jeopardize the accuracy of the census” because, due to concerns about 
answers assisting immigration enforcement, “immigrants may either avoid the census altogether 
or deliberately misreport themselves as legal residents”).  
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census results would not be given to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service officials for use in deportation proceedings.”169 This concern 
crystallized when a group favoring tougher immigration enforcement and 
limits on immigration, the Federation for American Immigration Reform 
(FAIR), sued the Secretary of Commerce over the failure to ask a 
citizenship question.170 Finding for the Commerce Secretary, a three-
judge district court panel observed that, according to census officials, a 
citizenship question would “inevitably jeopardize the overall accuracy of 
the population count” through a chilling effect on segments of the 
population anxious about “information being used against them” in 
immigration enforcement.171  
In 1980 and in subsequent years, officials from the census bureau and 
other departments testified in Congress that a citizenship question would 
cause undocumented people—perhaps joined by naturalized citizens or 
those with undocumented or lawful resident relatives—to 
“misunderstand or mistrust the census and fail or refuse to respond.”172 
Focus groups assembled after Secretary Ross’s decision to include the 
citizenship question provided strong evidence of mistrust expressed by 
minorities with immigrant ties, including persons of Hispanic, Chinese, 
Middle Eastern, North African, and Vietnamese heritage.173 Diminished 
response from these groups would then lead to losses in electoral 
representation and other benefits for states and cities with substantial 
proportions of undocumented and foreign-born individuals.  
B.  The Citizenship Question and Means–Ends Fit 
While the strong discretionary component in determining appropriate 
census questions usually calls for a less exacting standard of review,174 
under the approach taken in this Article, the departure from decades of 
practice and the collateral impacts just described warranted a closer look 
at the basis of Secretary Ross’s decision.175 To do that, one must first 
consider the administrative constitutionalist rationale behind asking the 
citizenship question.  
                                                                                                                 
 169. See MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 234 (2d ed. 
2015).  
 170. Fed’n for Am. Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 565 (D.D.C. 1980). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Hearing on H.R. 2661, supra note 162, at 53–54.  
 173. Michael Wines, Inside the Trump Administration’s Fight to Add a Citizenship Question 
to the Census, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/04/us/wilbur-ross-
commerce-secretary.html [https://perma.cc/Y4FF-ZNS2]. 
 174. Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1996) (per curiam). 
 175. Historical experience has been important in judicial review of census decisions. Id. at 
21; see also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 803–06 (1992) (discussing the relevance of 
historical practice).  
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Secretary Ross’s rationale for the change also centered on rights; for 
Secretary Ross, the putative touchstone was enforcement of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).176 In terms of intermediate scrutiny, ensuring 
effective VRA enforcement is clearly a significant objective. As 
Secretary Ross explained, VRA enforcement requires an accurate 
determination of the citizenship voting age population (CVAP) in each 
state, since only citizens can vote in federal elections.177 In the abstract, 
posing a citizenship question on the short-form census is a reasonable 
way to obtain this information, consistent with the Secretary of 
Commerce’s historic discretion.  
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, 
upheld the district court's injunction against the citizenship question and 
its remand to the Commerce Department. The Chief Justice took a 
deferential substantive view of Secretary Ross’s determination that 
asking a citizenship on the short-form census was a reasonable way to 
obtain citizenship information, but coupled that with a process-based 
finding that the Commerce Department’s VRA rationale was 
“contrived.”178 Chief Justice Roberts noted that whether to add a 
citizenship question to the census was an “important” decision that 
required “genuine justifications.”179 In this respect, the Chief Justice 
found the Commerce Department's decision lacking.  
Attacking the Commerce Department’s substantive reasoning, the 
challengers to Secretary Ross’s decision to add a citizenship question to 
the short-form census had argued that there are more accurate 
alternatives to the short-form census to accomplish the goal of obtaining 
citizenship data. Consider readily available administrative records. 
Secretary Ross’s own memo announcing the inclusion of the citizenship 
question conceded that “administrative records could be more accurate 
than self-responses” on the short form.180 Self-reporting is simply not a 
good way to obtain accurate citizenship information. Secretary Ross 
conceded that, in responding to other Census Bureau requests for 
information, approximately one-third of noncitizen respondents 
incorrectly report that they are U.S. citizens.181 Under the circumstances, 
adding a citizenship question to the short-form census seems like 
throwing good money after bad.  
                                                                                                                 
 176. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101, 10301–
14, 10501–08, 10701–02 (2012)); see also Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, supra note 3, at 1. 
 177. Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, supra note 3, at 1. 
 178. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019). 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. at 4; see also New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 535 
(S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 181. See Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, supra note 3, at 4.  
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Moreover, asking the citizenship question on the short-form census 
would have the adverse effect of “seriously jeopardiz[ing] the 
[distributive] accuracy of the census.”182 As noted above, experts agree 
that posing the question would deter participation by undocumented 
persons. It would thus skew the count against urban areas that are 
population centers for this cohort.183  
Chief Justice Roberts rejected each of these concerns and ruled out 
rigorous means–ends scrutiny of the Commerce Department’s decisions 
about what demographic information to seek on the short-form census.184 
As Chief Justice Roberts put it, both using administrative records and 
asking about citizenship on the short-form census involved “tradeoffs 
between accuracy and completeness.”185 For Chief Justice Roberts, 
assessing the merits of these tradeoffs was a job for the Secretary of 
Commerce, not the courts.186 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, disagreed on the question of substantive 
deference, asserting that the Commerce Department’s decision to add a 
citizenship question triggered issues of accuracy and completeness that 
rendered the decision arbitrary and capricious under the APA.187 
But for Chief Justice Roberts, the process followed by Secretary Ross 
in linking the short-form census citizenship question to VRA 
enforcement nonetheless merited affirmance of the district court's 
injunction against asking the citizenship question—a sentiment shared by 
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Roberts initially 
observed that the VRA rationale had “played an insignificant role in the 
decisionmaking process.”188 Explaining this conclusion, Roberts stated 
that, according to the record, Secretary Ross had reversed the order of 
steps in agency decisions, by starting with a desired outcome and then 
maneuvering to achieve this result. As Roberts observed, Secretary Ross 
was “determined” to add a citizenship question “from the time he entered 
office,” demanded that his staff “make it happen,” and—when that was 
unavailing—collared “the Attorney General himself” to ask if the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) would cite VRA enforcement in requesting 
insertion of a citizenship question.189 
All along the way, according to Chief Justice Roberts, the Commerce 
Department’s process showed the “contrived” nature of its VRA 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Hearing on H.R. 2661, supra note 162, at 43. 
 183. Id. at 43–44.  
 184. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2569. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 2571. 
 187. Id. at 2587–92 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting).  
 188. Id. at 2574. 
 189. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2574. 
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rationale.190 Ross's initial attempts to induce other agencies to request 
census-based citizenship data targeted the Department of Homeland 
Security and DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
respectively, although neither agency has any role at all in VRA 
enforcement.191 When—after Secretary Ross’s buttonholing of the 
Attorney General—the DOJ Civil Rights Division requested insertion of 
a citizenship question, its request was baldly instrumental, focusing on 
promoting Secretary Ross’s desired outcome, not obtaining actual 
citizenship data.192 Indeed, the December 2017 DOJ request parroted the 
language and reasoning of Secretary Ross's staff and advisors.193 In its 
indifference to alternative ways to obtain data needed for VRA 
enforcement, the DOJ request diverged markedly from “typical” agency 
requests for assistance.194 
In isolation, each of these data points may have been insufficient to 
prompt doubts about the Commerce Department’s good faith. Cabinet 
secretaries and other senior officials carry their policy predilections into 
office with them and work both with senior colleagues and subordinates 
to refine the legal basis for a policy decision.195 However, viewed in 
context, the Commerce Department’s process illustrated a “disconnect” 
between its decision and the VRA rationale, indicating that the latter was 
“contrived” rather than “genuine.”196 
Chief Justice Roberts appeared to reject rigorous means–ends scrutiny 
in the census case, instead opting for scrutiny of Secretary Ross’s process 
in matching the VRA rationale with the decision to ask the citizenship 
question. However, Chief Justice Roberts’ process-based approach 
paralleled means-ends scrutiny.197 Roberts’ inquiry concerned whether 
Secretary Ross had acted in “bad faith” in seeking to link the citizenship 
question to VRA enforcement.198 A means–ends inquiry would have 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Id. at 2575.  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2575. 
 195. Id. at 2574–75; see also In re Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. 16, 17 (2018) (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]here’s nothing unusual about a new cabinet 
secretary coming to office inclined to favor a different policy direction, soliciting support from 
other agencies to bolster his views, disagreeing with staff, or cutting through red tape.”) (granting 
stay of district court’s order to take Secretary Ross’s deposition). 
 196. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2575–76. 
 197. Cf. Richard Fallon, Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
523, 545 (2016) (citing Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental 
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443 (1996)) (discussing how tests 
used by courts serve as vehicles for revealing impermissible governmental intent).  
 198. Department of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2573–74. 
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asked whether other alternative means were available to obtain 
citizenship data for achieving this goal. While Roberts did not ask this 
question directly in his opinion, he did note that the Census Bureau 
professionals had asked DOJ whether alternative means would address 
their concerns, and that DOJ had declined to explore other options besides 
the citizenship question.199 DOJ officials’ indifference suggested that 
their real focus was not VRA enforcement. Instead, it was nakedly 
instrumental—providing cover for Secretary Ross’s attempt to insert the 
citizenship question.  
In this sense, Roberts’ approach in the census case harmonized with 
means–ends scrutiny, which analyzes the relationship of means and ends 
to smoke out pretextual motivation.200 Given Roberts’ ferreting out of 
pretext through weighing the government’s process against its putative 
rationale, the Chief Justice’s earlier discussion of deference to 
government choices about accuracy and completeness seems like dicta. 
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts’ willingness to look behind the 
government’s putative rationale occurred in the context of a threshold 
rescission: the government’s abrupt reversal of a concededly “important” 
policy choice.201  
IV.  THE DACA AND TPS RESCISSIONS 
Finally, this Article addresses two immigration issues concerning the 
Trump Administration’s efforts to rescind DACA and TPS. Here, too, 
agencies have a substantial measure of discretion. That is most evident 
with DACA, which entails deferred action—a form of relief rooted in the 
agency’s convenience and enforcement priorities.202 But TPS also 
undeniably entails discretion; indeed, Congress has insulated particular 
decisions about TPS from judicial review.203 That said, both are threshold 
measures: each determines whether a recipient can legally live and work 
in the United States. Rescinding each form of relief therefore should 
trigger robust means–ends scrutiny. However, in both cases, that scrutiny 
                                                                                                                 
 199. Id. at 2575.  
 200. See Fallon, Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, supra note 197. 
 201. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2575. 
 202. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012) (explaining the importance of 
discretion in immigration enforcement); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 
471, 484 (1999) (noting that immigration enforcement units exercise discretion not to commence 
removal proceedings, which the Court termed “deferred action,” based on a range of factors, 
including “humanitarian reasons or simply for [their] . . . own convenience”); Heckler v. Chaney, 
470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (explaining why the Court held that most agency decisions not to 
start regulatory enforcement proceedings were unreviewable under the APA); see also Ronald M. 
Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 715–17 
(1990) (discussing pragmatic considerations in Chaney). 
 203. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
39
Margulies: Rescinding Inclusion in the Administrative State: Adjudicating DA
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1468 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
focuses on the processes and modes of explanation that the agency has 
used. While each rescission fails the test, further effort could reverse that 
finding.  
A.  The Constitutionalist Origins of the DACA Program  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) justified DACA 
initially as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion providing work 
authorization and a renewable reprieve from removal to foreign nationals 
who came to the United States as children and had no path to a legal 
status.204 As the Supreme Court observed in Heckler v. Chaney,205 a 
decision about whether to commence either a criminal prosecution or a 
regulatory proceeding is a product of an agency’s “ordering of its 
priorities.”206 In ranking its own priorities, an agency’s knowledge of its 
own budget and personnel renders it “far better equipped” than the courts 
to assess the appropriateness of bringing a particular enforcement 
proceeding.207   
That said, DACA—as well as the larger program for undocumented 
parents, DAPA—also sprang from an administrative constitutionalist 
                                                                                                                 
 204. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. 
Aguilar et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (June 15, 2012), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-
came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N42-EALH]; see also Margulies, supra note 22, at 
177 (2014) (analyzing DACA and finding it legal but conceding this was a close question). 
Compare Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 781, 856 (2013) (asserting that DACA went beyond the scope of delegation), with SHOBA 
SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN 
IMMIGRATION CASES 54–59 (2015) (arguing that the ambit of discretion under INA included large-
scale programs such as DACA). The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel relied on a 
similar rationale in authorizing a larger program of immigration benefits, Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans (DAPA). See Memorandum from Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S. (Nov. 
19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/file/179206/download [https://perma.cc/HK2B-RWQV]. The 
Fifth Circuit subsequently ruled that DAPA exceeded Congress’s delegation to the President. See 
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 180 (5th Cir. 2015); cf. Josh Blackman, The 
Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 213, 
284 (2015) (arguing that DAPA exceeded presidential power). The author of this Article served 
as co-counsel for amici curiae in the Supreme Court phase of the Texas case, arguing that DAPA 
exceeded the agency’s statutory authority. See Brief for Former Homeland Security, Justice, and 
State Department Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, United States v. Texas, 
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674).  
 205. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 206. Id. at 832.  
 207. Id. 
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vision and revealed that concept’s normative tensions.208 DACA, with its 
solicitude for undocumented persons who came to the United States as 
children, echoed the notes of inclusion that the Supreme Court had first 
articulated in Plyler v. Doe,209 which barred states from denying public 
education to undocumented children. Finding that Texas’s exclusionary 
legislation violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court, in an opinion 
by Justice William Brennan, utilized a robust brand of means–ends 
scrutiny.210 Citing the U.S. Attorney General’s acknowledgment that the 
federal government could not possibly deport all undocumented children 
within the foreseeable future, Justice Brennan found that Texas’s aim of 
conserving resources was self-defeating.211 Texas’s policy would not 
conserve resources in the long run for Texas or other jurisdictions, Justice 
Brennan opined.212 Rather, Texas’s exclusion of undocumented children 
would impose social costs—what economists call negative 
externalities—by creating a cohort that lacked basic education and was 
therefore less able to contribute to the country.213  
Prior to his presidency, then-senator Barack Obama invoked a vision 
closely resembling Plyler’s in addressing the predicament of 
undocumented children.214 In his manifesto, The Audacity of Hope, 
Obama warned against withholding from undocumented persons—
especially children—“the rights and opportunities that we take for 
                                                                                                                 
 208. See generally Alina Das, Administrative Constitutionalism in Immigration Law, 98 B.U. 
L. REV. 485 (2018) (explaining why there is less overt recourse to constitutionalism among 
immigration officials compared with other agencies).  
 209. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 210. Id. at 230. 
 211. Id. at 226. 
 212. Id. at 226, 230. 
 213. Recognizing the limits of the Court’s holding, however, Justice Brennan acknowledged 
that Congress, which has primary responsibility for immigration policy and includes 
representatives of all states, retained the power under the Equal Protection Clause to enact such 
exclusive policies if it wished. Id. at 225. 
 214. Supplementing this elaboration of Plyler, one can also view DACA as an extension of 
the president’s authority to protect actual and intending Americans. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 
64 (1889) (describing an episode in which President Franklin Pierce protected the Hungarian 
refugee and intending American citizen Martin Koszta as support for presidential power to protect 
federal officials). See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993) (arguing that there is essentially no presidential law-making power). 
Others have studied whether the President has constitutional power to decide how or if to enforce 
the law. Compare Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 671, 674–75 (2014) (suggesting constitutional limits on any such power), with Kate Andrias, 
The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1035–36 (2013) (arguing for a 
broader conception). Many of these arguments also touch on which conception best promotes the 
rule of law. See David S. Rubenstein, Taking Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
168, 170–71 (2018) (noting contradictions in arguments, practice, and rhetoric regarding the rule 
of law).  
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granted.”215 Taking this exclusionary path, Obama grimly predicted, 
would create a “servant class in our midst” and spawn “inequality 
that . . . feeds racial strife.”216 President Obama’s 2012 op-ed heralding 
DACA’s roll-out invoked this vision of equality even more forthrightly, 
framing DACA’s beneficiaries as “young people who study in our 
schools, play in our neighborhoods, are friends with our kids, and pledge 
allegiance to the flag.”217 Beneficiaries of DACA, President Obama 
declared, “are Americans in their heart and minds, in every single way 
but one: on paper.”218 For President Obama, DACA would resolve that 
unjust anomaly.  
B.  The Structural Counter to Broad-Based Deferred Action 
Yet, this assertion of equality had to compete with a structural 
constitutionalist retort. Challengers of DACA and the much larger 
program, DAPA, that President Obama sought to initiate in 2014, 
grounded their critique in the separation of powers.219 On this view, 
President Obama’s programs exceeded the bounds of executive 
discretion.220 The Trump Administration initially relied in part on this 
competing constitutionalist paradigm and later invoked a related statutory 
argument citing doubts that Congress had delegated such broad-based 
discretion to the agency.221   
The statutory argument started with the Supreme Court’s now-
familiar dictum that Congress does not customarily deposit “elephants in 
mouseholes” by delegating boundless discretion to the executive through 
ambiguous or generic statutory provisions.222 The Immigration and 
                                                                                                                 
 215. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 268 (2006). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See Barack Obama, A Nation of Laws and a Nation of Immigrants, TIME 
(June 17, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/06/17/a-nation-of-laws-and-a-nation-of-immigrants/ 
[https://perma.cc/DBP6-UFUR]. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 180 (5th Cir. 2015); Blackman, supra note 
204, at 217.  
 220. See Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, 
Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (2015). 
 221. See Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 1 (asserting that both DAPA 
and DACA did not fit the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) “comprehensive scheme” and 
that this mismatch with the statute raised “serious doubts about [DACA’s] legality”); see also 
Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to James W. 
McCament et al., Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca [https://perma.cc/GXK2-
7WSJ] (citing statutory arguments and Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s claim that DACA was an 
unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive branch). See generally Blackman, supra note 
204 (framing the argument against DACA in both statutory and constitutional terms). 
 222. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
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Nationality Act (INA) is a carefully wrought structure that crafts specific 
categories of legal status to accommodate several potentially conflicting 
goals: family reunification, humanitarian values, economic prosperity, 
and law enforcement. For example, requiring that U.S. citizens be at least 
twenty-one years old to sponsor a parent for lawful permanent 
residence223 addresses the so-called “anchor baby” problem by deterring 
unlawful entrants from obtaining immigration benefits through a post-
entry U.S.-citizen child.224 The age floor was a key element of the 1965 
immigration amendments, which repealed national origin quotas that for 
decades had throttled legal immigration.225  
Similarly, Congress has repeatedly warned that higher-than-specified 
levels of immigration could roil the job market, impairing the 
employment prospects and wage levels of U.S. citizens and lawful 
permanent residents.226 That deep-seated legislative anxiety impelled the 
1986 Congress to provide for sanctions on employers hiring 
undocumented workers in a compromise that also provided immigrants 
with a major victory by legalizing a substantial number of undocumented 
persons living in the United States.227 In addition, Congress has restricted 
the ability of noncitizens without a legal status to obtain relief such as a 
                                                                                                                 
 223. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CHRISTINA M. 
RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 251 (5th ed. 2009) (explaining the 
immediate relative category). 
 224. Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Naturalization of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 20 (1965) (statement of Sen. Sam Ervin); see also id. at 230–
31 (colloquy between Senators Ervin and Robert F. Kennedy on rationale for age floor on U.S. 
citizen sponsors); Margulies, supra note 220, at 1200–01 (discussing circumstances and results of 
this exchange). 
 225. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New 
Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 279, 297–98 (1996) 
(describing the national origins quota system in place prior to the 1965 legislation). 
 226. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 108 (1996) (finding that access to U.S. jobs was a “magnet” 
for unlawful migration). 
 227. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201, 100 Stat. 
3359, 3394; cf. S. REP. NO. 99-132, at 16 (1985) (describing the 1986 legalization as a “‘one-time 
only’ program”). Seeking to reassure Congress and other stakeholders that grants of deferred 
action, typically including a work permit, outside IRCA would be small in number, the Justice 
Department stated in 1987 that the “number of aliens authorized to accept employment [pursuant 
to deferred action outside IRCA] is quite small and the impact on the labor market is minimal.” 
See Classes of Aliens Eligible, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,092, 46,092 (Dec. 4, 1987) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 109) (emphasis added). Indeed, officials claimed that the number of work authorizations was so 
small that it was “previously considered to be not worth recording.” Id. at 46,093 (emphasis 
added). 
43
Margulies: Rescinding Inclusion in the Administrative State: Adjudicating DA
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1472 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
reprieve from removal and a work permit.228 Sweeping awards of 
deferred action risk eroding Congress’s limits.229  
While Congress did mention “deferred action” in the INA, statutory 
acknowledgment of this practice extends only to foreign nationals with a 
clear pathway to a legal status.230 Apart from situations in which deferred 
action is a “bridge” to a legal status, grants have been relatively rare, 
typically responding to hardships such as illness or old age.231 DAPA was 
to be a far larger program, and DACA also aids more immigrants than 
traditional hardship-based relief.232 The size of each program 
demonstrates its tensions with the statutory scheme. Virtually none of the 
actual or prospective recipients of either program could have used 
deferred action as a bridge to a legal status that would be available within 
a reasonable time.233  
At the same time, DACA recipients can invoke compelling equities. 
First, as minors at the time of their entry into the United States, DACA 
recipients simply complied with their parents’ instructions; they had no 
legal or practical capacity to veto their parents’ plans. Second, as 
                                                                                                                 
 228. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A) (curbing practice of immigration officials who had 
granted extended voluntary departure (EVD) to individuals who did not fit into any established 
visa category by limiting EVD to 120 days). 
 229. Cf. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 180 (5th Cir. 2015) (discussing basis for 
holding that DAPA exceeded delegation). The Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel 
memorandum supporting DAPA recognized the program’s impact. See Memorandum from Karl 
R. Thompson, supra note 204, at 31 (acknowledging that “the potential size of the program is 
large”). 
 230. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d)(1), (2) (providing for stay of removal and acknowledging 
availability of deferred action for applicants for visas created for victims of crime generally and 
victims of trafficking in particular, so that applicants do not undergo hardship of removal as they 
await processing of their applications); see also Texas, 809 F.3d at 184–85 (asserting that Family 
Fairness program granting deferred action to spouses and children of those legalized in 1986 was 
a “bridge[]” to legal status, since those legalized were already authorized to sponsor spouses and 
children for permanent residence); cf. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and 
Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 121 n.39 (2015) (arguing for broad presidential 
discretion but acknowledging with respect to Family Fairness program that, “those legalized . . . 
would become eligible to petition for the admission of their spouses and children through the 
already existing immigration system” (emphasis added)).  
 231. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 n.8 (1999) 
(suggesting range of factors supporting grant of deferred action on a “case-by-case basis”); see 
also WADHIA, supra note 204, at 28 (outlining the need for prosecutorial discretion when making 
immigration-related decisions about noncitizens with severe medical illnesses).  
 232. See NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 461 (D.D.C. 2018) (noting that DACA 
currently has over 800,000 recipients). 
 233. See Memorandum from Karl R. Thompson, supra note 204, at 29 n.14 (acknowledging 
that express statutory requirements stemming from law enforcement concerns would “likely not 
permit” prospective DAPA recipients to remain with their families “for the entire duration of the 
time until a visa is awarded” and indeed would often mandate protracted separations). 
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President Obama observed, DACA recipients have from an early age 
developed social, educational, and cultural ties to the United States,234 but 
conspicuously lack an ongoing relationship with their countries of origin. 
For DACA recipients enrolled in the program since its inception in 2012, 
participation in the program has deepened this disjuncture between ties 
to the United States and lack of connection abroad. Compared with 
DAPA, deferred action under DACA thus more closely parallels 
immigration officials’ venerable practice of granting removable persons 
relief from a range of hardships.235  
This failure to address parallels between DACA and traditional uses 
of deferred action erodes the rescission’s means–ends fit. Recall that 
DHS Secretary Nielsen asserted that rescinding DACA would address 
officials’ “serious doubts” about the program’s lawfulness.236 Secretary 
Nielsen’s memorandum relied on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texas v. 
United States,237 holding that DAPA was not congruent with the INA’s 
“comprehensive scheme.”238 However, Secretary Nielsen failed to 
adequately address distinctions between DAPA and DACA.239 A fuller 
explanation would have cemented the case for a rescission.240  
                                                                                                                 
 234. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 204, at 2 (noting that many DACA 
recipients “have already contributed to our country in significant ways”).  
 235. See WADHIA, supra note 204, at 57. But see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 204, at 794–
95, 856 (asserting that DACA exceeded presidential authority).  
 236. Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 1, at 2.  
 237. 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 238. Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 1, at 2; see Texas, 809 F.3d at 179–
88. 
 239. See NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 472 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 240. See id. The Ninth Circuit has taken a narrower view of DHS’s options at this stage, 
finding that DHS had to show not merely that questions existed about DACA’s legality, but that 
the program was clearly unlawful. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
908 F.3d 476, 505–10 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding an APA violation); id. at 518–20 (finding that DHS 
had to show DACA was clearly unlawful, also finding colorable equal protection violation). For 
the reasons detailed in the text, the Ninth Circuit’s view unduly restricts DHS’s authority under 
the INA and requires more than the Constitution compels. Along the same lines, the Ninth Circuit 
needlessly hamstrung DHS by holding that the APA required the agency to comprehensively state 
its rationale for rescission upon announcement of its decision, rather than permitting DHS to 
supplement its decision when courts sought clarification. But see id. at 505 (arguing that under 
the APA, DHS had to clearly state its reasons when announcing the rescission, and that DHS’s 
pivot from a categorical judgment that DACA was unlawful to reliance on mere doubts about 
DACA’s legality violated the principle articulated in the Supreme Court’s decision in SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), that an agency can justify an action only by citing reasons 
that the agency considered before the action was taken). Under the view of the Constitution 
expressed here, an agency would have a reasonable opportunity to refine its rationale, and an 
initial judgment that a program was categorically unlawful would not undermine a subsequent 
finding that the program triggered serious legal doubts. 
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Concededly, as with DAPA, DACA engendered legal questions 
because it announced “public policies of non-enforcement . . . for broad 
classes and categories of” otherwise removable foreign nationals.241 
However, the Nielsen memorandum did not fully address arguments for 
DACA’s legality, including its overlap with ongoing use of prosecutorial 
discretion to alleviate hardships such as youth, age, or disability.242 While 
DHS might well be able to make such a showing, it has thus far failed to 
do so. This failure would warrant halting the DACA rescission on equal 
protection grounds, although a more detailed future explanation could 
support the Administration’s decision.243 
C.  Rescinding Temporary Protected Status 
The courts should also analyze under intermediate scrutiny the Trump 
Administration’s rescission of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for 
longtime recipients from Haiti, El Salvador, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
and Sudan. Generally, both an initial designation and a termination of 
TPS would be discretionary decisions, subject to either relaxed review or 
no review at all.244 However, the process of termination should be 
reviewable if the challenger raises constitutional claims.245 The Trump 
Administration’s termination of TPS to the above-mentioned countries 
                                                                                                                 
 241. Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, supra note 1, at 2. 
 242. See WADHIA, supra note 204, at 57. 
 243. Challengers to the DACA rescission have made out a prima facie case of discriminatory 
intent. As a backdrop, consider that 93% of DACA recipients are undocumented people of 
Hispanic origin, generally from Mexico or Central America. See Regents, 908 F.3d at 518. 
Candidate and now President Trump has showered insults on this group, referring to them as 
rapists, human traffickers, drug dealers, gang members, and terrorists. See, e.g., id. at 519–20; 
Michelle Mark, Trump Just Referred to One of His Most Infamous Comments: Calling Mexicans 
‘Rapists,’ BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 5, 2018, 3:50 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-
mexicans-rapists-remark-reference-2018-4 [https://perma.cc/4XEM-6KRC]. The Supreme Court 
declined to view candidate and President Trump’s statements about Muslims as triggering 
heightened scrutiny of the president’s travel ban. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 
(2018). However, candidate and President Trump’s statements on Central Americans and 
Mexicans are more pervasive and personal. See Regents, 908 F.3d at 520 (suggesting that DACA 
challengers provided “substantially greater evidence of discriminatory motivation”). Those 
statements meet the challengers’ burden, if a court requires such a showing. 
 244. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) (2012) (precluding judicial review of decisions regarding 
designation, extension, or termination of TPS). 
 245. See Saget v. Trump, 345 F. Supp. 3d 287, 294–96 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Saget, 375 F. Supp. 
3d at 341–55 (granting a preliminary injunction against termination of TPS for Haitians); NAACP 
v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 364 F. Supp. 3d 568, 576–78 (D. Md. 2019) (finding that plaintiffs 
challenging revocation of TPS to Haitians had stated a plausible claim for relief). Acting due to 
injunctions against termination of TPS, the Department of Homeland Security has extended TPS 
for current recipients. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Temporary Protected Status (2019), 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status [https://perma.cc/Y9NB-DJ49]. 
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was not a particularized decision, but a categorical pivot away from TPS 
per se. That categorical pivot fails to fit means to ends. 
TPS itself began, not as a statute, but as executive action.246 The 
protective power of the presidency has constitutional roots in the 
President’s authority over foreign affairs.247 For over 150 years, 
presidents have protected intending Americans and those present in this 
country from hostile sovereigns.248 The period of American dominance 
after World War II saw greater use of this authority.249 Ultimately, 
Congress codified presidential power to protect individuals coming from 
abroad or already here from danger and hardship based on armed conflict, 
natural disasters, or other “extraordinary and temporary conditions” that 
impede foreign nationals from “returning . . . in safety” to their country 
of origin.250 Even after Congress enacted the TPS provisions, presidents 
have reserved to themselves constitutional power to take action that 
supplements statutory protections.251   
The challengers to the Trump Administration’s rescissions of TPS 
argue that the Administration has not complied with comprehensive 
statutory criteria in assessing the prospects for TPS recipients’ safe 
return. In place of these comprehensive criteria, challengers allege that 
the current Administration has focused in an arbitrary and artificial way 
on whether the conditions that gave rise to the initial designation have 
persisted.252 This narrower analysis precludes adequate consideration of 
other factors, such as new natural disasters, that would make return 
unsafe.253 The Trump Administration’s narrower approach erodes 
                                                                                                                 
 246. See Margulies, supra note 22, at 107. 
 247. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63–64 (1890); Monaghan, supra note 214, at 3–5.  
 248. See Margulies, supra note 22, at 112–13. 
 249. See, e.g., id. at 127 (discussing the Bracero Program and its representation of the 
president’s broad power). 
 250. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1) (2012).  
 251. See George H.W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990, THE AM. 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 29, 1990), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19117 
[https://perma.cc/HQ95-Q2F8] (asserting that the Executive might have constitutional power to 
protect otherwise deportable foreign nationals facing exigent situations in their country of origin); 
see also White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Memorandum – Deferred Enforced 
Departure for Liberians, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/09/26/presidential-memorandum-deferred-enforced-departure-liberians 
[https://perma.cc/SLR3-NLXA] (announcing relief from removal for Liberians who previously 
had TPS and asserting “[his] constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United 
States”). 
 252. Saget v. Trump, 345 F. Supp. 3d 287, 287, 294, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 253. Centro Presente v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 332 F. Supp. 3d 393, 402–04 (D. Mass. 
2018).  
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statutory protections, according to the challengers, and amounts to a 
rewriting of the TPS provisions. 254  
In addition to making this constitutional argument, the challengers 
also cite the collateral impact caused by the rescissions of TPS.255 In 
many cases, TPS recipients have been in the United States for well over 
a decade and in some cases, have resided in the United States for an even 
longer period of time.256 In the course of that stay, TPS recipients have 
developed ties to persons and entities in the United States.257 That process 
has been reciprocal. As a result, the collateral impact of a paradigm shift 
in TPS criteria equals or exceeds the impact of DACA’s rescission.  
The Trump Administration can point to a competing vision of 
administrative constitutionalism also centered on government 
responsibility. Generally, administration officials have argued that their 
determinations have been consistent with statutory criteria. However, one 
could also argue that the Trump Administration is seeking a sea change 
that will protect U.S. sovereignty from a slow-motion surrender to 
incursions from foreign nationals whose presence was supposed to be 
“temporary.” As time passes, that presence seems more and more 
permanent. Arguably, the slide into permanence does violence to the 
statutory scheme and to U.S. sovereign prerogatives, which the Trump 
Administration wishes to reassert. The Administration’s allusion in 
correspondence to an “America first” perspective on TPS reinforces this 
trope.258  
While this justification for rescission invokes the federal 
government’s responsibility, exercising that responsibility here is 
inconsistent with a categorical judgment to terminate TPS. Rather, the 
Due Process Clause requires that the Administration consider each TPS 
country designation, extension, and termination separately on its 
                                                                                                                 
 254.  Saget, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 299.  
 255.  Id. See generally Amanda Baran et al., The Cost to Taxpayers, GDP, and Businesses 
of Ending TPS, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (Apr. 2017), https://www.ilrc.org/ 
sites/default/files/resources/2017-04-18_economic_contributions_by_salvadoran_honduran_ 
and_haitian_tps_holders.pdf. [https://perma.cc/3K8L-GQRB] (summarizing some of the impact 
caused by the rescissions of TPS).  
 256.  Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, A Statistical and Demographic Profile of the US 
Temporary Protected Status Populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti, 5 JMHS 
577, 578 (2017), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/233150241700500302 [https:// 
perma.cc/Z67A-PZGC]. 
 257. See The Consequences of Terminating Temporary Protected Status, CATH. LEGAL 
IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC. 3, https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/resources/The-Consequences-
of-Terminating-Temporary-Protected-Status.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD4K-9ZBY]. 
 258.  See Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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merits.259 The statute contemplates a look at whether TPS still serves the 
statutory criteria, including whether TPS recipients can return in 
safety.260 For example, regarding Haiti, DHS would consider whether 
safe return was impossible in light of post-designation conditions, 
including a devastating hurricane and a cholera epidemic.261  
Instead, evidence submitted in each of the cases suggests that DHS, 
guided by the White House, first decided to terminate TPS for virtually 
all countries that have had it and then engaged in a narrow review that 
omitted the “return in safety” condition.262 That is not a narrowly tailored 
review of individual TPS designations; it is a wholesale pivot divorced 
from the merits and a “strong break with past practice.”263 More 
importantly, it fails means–ends scrutiny. Under the approach taken here, 
DHS could revise its finding to include all current factors that imperil 
safe return, whether or not they existed at the time of the initial 
designation. That solution ensures due deliberation, but also provides 
sufficient space for administrative discretion in a democracy.264 
CONCLUSION 
If this Article has covered a lot of substantive ground, it is because the 
Trump Administration has endeavored to do the same as it rescinds 
programs, policies, and practices of previous administrations. Of course, 
the latter is not necessarily imprudent or unlawful. Indeed, competition 
about programs and priorities is the essence of democracy. Often, law 
will have little to say, and the courts no role to play. However, this Article 
                                                                                                                 
 259. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33 (1982) (holding that due process applied 
in the case of a lawful permanent resident returning to United States). Equal protection is also 
relevant here to the extent that TPS recipients subject to a categorical termination of their status 
are—as a group—being treated differently than earlier TPS recipients. 
 260. See Saget, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 287, 292, 298, 299. 
 261. Id. at 299. 
 262. Ramos, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1099 (finding that then-DHS Secretary Elaine Duke was 
informed by the White House of a “strategy” that apparently involved categorical judgment to 
terminate TPS). As noted with respect to Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross’s contacts on the 
census with other officials outside the Department of Commerce, senior officials can convey 
White House priorities to others in the administration. However, that communication should not 
include ordering officials to disregard statutory mandates. See supra Section III.B. 
 263. Ramos, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 1104 (quoting Degen Decl., Ex. 30).  
 264. If the challengers had to first make a prima facie showing of intent, they could cite to 
statements by President Trump. See Saget, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 303 (noting that upon learning 
15,000 Haitians had obtained visas in 2017, Trump allegedly said “they all have AIDS”) (quoting 
First Amended Complaint at 18, Saget v. Trump, 345 F. Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:18-
cv-01599)). As with DACA, these statements are more pervasive than those in the travel ban case, 
and also address persons already living in the United States. Cf. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 
2418 (2018) (cautioning about “delicate” task of parsing candidates’ and officials’ statements).  
49
Margulies: Rescinding Inclusion in the Administrative State: Adjudicating DA
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1478 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
argues that judicial review should be robust in assessing threshold 
rescissions.  
Threshold measures include baseline criteria for institutional 
participation, as well as rules governing access to political representation 
and to the ability to live and work in the United States. Rescinding these 
measures upsets reliance interests. Because of the factfinding already 
invested in such rules and the legislative support they enjoy, courts should 
shift their familiar deferential stance to more exacting scrutiny of 
threshold rescissions’ means–ends fit. 
This Article’s approach also aims to provide a normative facet to 
scholarly discussions of administrative constitutionalism. Scholars have 
recently pointed to compelling examples of agencies interpreting the 
Constitution outside of the courts to promote certain policies.265 Instances 
include expanding the definition of conscientious objection to the draft, 
curbing unfair state welfare policies, and promoting equal employment 
opportunity.266 In each case, officials, including future Justices 
Frankfurter and Stone in the conscientious objector example, went 
beyond what courts had mandated and implemented a distinctively 
administrative vision of the Constitution. 
The administrative constitutionalism literature is still in an early stage 
of development and also has focused most intently on descriptions of the 
resourceful and dedicated public servants described above. It therefore 
has spent less time on normative issues. For example, scholars have not 
advanced criteria for ranking disparate administrative constitutionalist 
visions. That task is important, because one constitutionalist vision will 
often trigger contending visions. Those contending approaches will each 
cite the government’s constitutional responsibilities, the limits of 
government power, and the rights of others. In addressing threshold 
rescissions proposed by the Trump Administration, this Article seeks to 
fill that gap. 
In responding to threshold rescissions such as the Trump 
Administration’s pivots on military transgender policy, the census, 
DACA, and TPS, the approach taken here subjects these moves to 
intermediate scrutiny. Courts should consider the means–ends fit of these 
shifts, ensuring that each is adequately tailored to a significant 
government objective. In the case of military transgender policy, tailoring 
would disaggregate the Department of Defense’s rollback, which already 
correctly grandfathers in service members who acted in reliance on the 
Obama Administration’s reforms. The longer stability requirement for 
accession would pass muster, but other components of the 2018 
                                                                                                                 
 265. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 17, at 1112. 
 266. See generally, e.g., Lee, supra note 21 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of 
equal employment opportunity); Tani, Administrative Equal Protection, supra note 17 (discussing 
this phenomenon in the context of welfare programs).  
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Department of Defense policy would fall, including the bar on retention 
of service members who require accommodations for their expressed 
gender in bunking, bathroom use, and showering. Much of the 2018 
policy, despite its drafting through a review process, does not effectively 
counter the common-sense arguments for inclusion made by Obama 
Administration Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, including Secretary 
Carter’s argument that base rates are manageable and inclusion best 
allows the military to address the needs of transgender individuals who 
already serve.  
On the census, DACA, and TPS, the approach taken here centers on 
the process for reaching and explaining a decision. As Chief Justice 
Roberts explained in the census case, the government’s putative goal of 
enhancing VRA enforcement through asking a citizenship question was 
“contrived” in light of the process used to assert that rationale.267 On 
DACA and TPS, DHS must provide fuller explanations: respectively 
addressing parallels between DACA and prior permissible uses of 
deferred action, and factors that interfere with TPS recipients’ safe return, 
even when those factors were not present at the time of the initial TPS 
designation.  
The approach taken here will not unduly burden incoming 
administrations. Often, as in the case of the 2018 Department of Defense 
policy’s rule on accession and stability, means–ends scrutiny will uphold 
the change. In other cases, such as DACA and TPS, compliance will 
entail more comprehensive explanation. That burden is not unreasonable 
in a constitutional democracy. Perhaps the prospect of deeper public 
explanation will lead to the rethinking of some substantive measures. But 
that moderating influence is precisely what the Framers intended. Some 
administrations will deem it prudent to dial back their rhetoric to avoid 
promising more than they can deliver. That is an added virtue in a system 
that values continuity as well as discretion. Indeed, tempering rhetorical 
excesses may allow each side to more fully explore the other’s vision of 
administrative constitutionalism. That, too, would match the Framers’ 
design. 
                                                                                                                 
 267. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019).  
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